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I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent does the legal framework of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) permit trade restrictions that, at least in part, express the
moral beliefs of particular societies and have a root in noninstrumental
morality?
This Article will consider this question using the current Seal Products
dispute as an example. The Seal Products dispute between the European Union,
Canada, and Norway will be the first occasion on which the WTO dispute
settlement organs are required to consider noninstrumental rationales
(expressions of intrinsic moral or spiritual beliefs) as a distinct basis for trade-
restrictive measures.' While the WTO dispute settlement system is no stranger
to cases regarding the treatment of animals,2 the policies at issue in earlier cases
related to objectives-such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources-
that are anchored in environmental science and international policy, or that are
related instrumentally to the protection of human life and health or economic
interests.3 The EU seal products ban is in part aimed instrumentally at
improving animal health and welfare, but it is also based on a level of
protection for the animals in question that is grounded in the community's
ethical beliefs about the nature of cruelty and the unacceptability of
consumption behavior that is complicit with that cruelty.
We will argue that the WTO legal framework allows countries to adopt
trade restrictive measures based on anti-cruelty concerns, both to protect the
animals and to express moral censure of those practices. Under WTO law, there
is ample policy space for countries to express beliefs concerning the treatment
of animals through nondiscriminatory trade measures. Further, and more
generally, we deploy our analysis of animal welfare in the Seal Products
dispute in order to espouse a conception of pluralism that recognizes the
importance of expressive, noninstrumental rationales for state decisionmaking,
even if those rationales differ or are understood and articulated differently in
1. Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic
Relations: The Public Morals of GA TT's Article XX(a) and "Conventional" Rules of Interpretation, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1998); Laura Nielsen, Emotional and Legal Stakes Are High in the Seals
Dispute, BRIDGES, Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 9, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridges l4-4.pdf
("[T]he emerging dispute on the European Union's import ban on seal products is likely to become a
landmark case in WTO jurisdiction."); Edward M. Thomas, Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an
Animal Welfare-Based Trade Restriction Under GATT's Moral Exception, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
605, 607 (2007) (stating that an animal welfare case would be a "landmark" decision for the WTO). For
prior academic treatment of this issue, see Catherine Jean Archibald, Forbidden by the WTO?
Discrimination Against a Product When Its Creation Causes Harm to the Environment or Animal
Welfare, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 15 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Christine M. Cuccia, Note, Protecting Animals in the Name of Biodiversity:
Effects of the Uruguay Round of Measures Regulating Methods of Harvesting, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 481
(1995); see also Nielsen, supra note 1, at 9 (contrasting the Seal Products cases with prior WTO
jurisprudence on environmental issues).
3. One partial exception is the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, which will be discussed below. See,
e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp/Turtle]; Panel Report, United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, 395/155 (Sept. 3, 1991).
368
2012] Permitting Pluralism 369
different societies and cultures. If noninstrumental considerations were
impermissible grounds for trade restrictive action, countries would not be able
to restrict trade for many sincerely held philosophical or religious reasons.4 For
example, Israel would not be able to prohibit the importation of nonkosher
foods,5 and a state with a large Hindu majority would not be able to prohibit
imports of bovine meat.6 Adopting this position would constitute considerable
overreach on the part of the WTO.'
On September 16, 2009, the European Union adopted a law banning the
import and export of most products made from seals.8 The measure was
explicitly adopted to protect animal welfare.9 The EU Parliament and Council
4. For a list of countries that have notified the WTO that they are restricting trade for moral
reasons, see Mark Wu, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly
Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 215 app. at 250-51 (2008). The authors
of this Article also received information that the government of India considers its restrictions on bovine
animals and animal products to be taken on the basis of public morals. E-mail from Suja Rishikesh,
Counsellor, Market Access Division, WTO, to Robert Howse (Feb. 22, 2011, 03:43 EST) (on file with
authors).
5. Israel currently justifies its ban on nonkosher meat on the basis of religious reasons. All
meat imports are assessed by the Council of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel to determine whether they are
kosher or not. Import Policy, FOREIGN TRADE ADMIN. (2012), http://www.tamas.gov.il/NR/exeres/
5EA6BOB6-D877-48D7-A21F-BE9337BFAO6A.htm.
6. India currently justifies its restrictions based on religious beliefs. For an extensive
discussion of the rationale behind India's various restrictions on cattle importation and production, see
Daphne Barak-Erez, Symbolic Constitutionalism: On Sacred Cows and Abominable Pigs, 6 LANGUAGE,
CULTURE, & HUMAN. 420 (2010).
7. One possible objection to our claim is that there should be a distinction between
religiously grounded trade restrictions and philosophically or culturally grounded ones. In a given
society, moral beliefs concerning the treatment of animals may be more or less grounded on religious
faith or tradition, cultural practices, philosophical ethics, or alternative forms of spirituality. Indeed, a
given individual's beliefs about animal welfare may be influenced by more than one of these sources.
An example is the Jewish vegetarian movement. From the pluralism perspective of this Article, it would
indeed stretch the institutional competence and legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement organs to
evaluate the extent to which public morals in a given society or among a predominant group in that
society derive from one or more of these various spiritual sources, either today or historically. The
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) considers that animal welfare standards should address
both religious and cultural aspects of animal welfare, without giving priority or distinct status to one or
the other. 2nd OIE Global Conference on Animal Welfare, Cairo (Egypt), Oct. 20-22, 2008,
Recommendations, WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, available at http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/
Home/eng/ConferencesEvents/sites/A AW2008/ANGFinal%20Recommendations.pdf (last visited
May 29, 2012). A 1998 agreement between the WTO and the OIE requires both "to act in collaboration
and to consult each other on questions of mutual interest . . . ." Agreement between the World Trade
Organization and the Office International des Epizooties, 1 1, WT/L/272 (July 8, 1998). The agreement
envisions cooperation primarily concerning sanitary measures, but is not limited to that. Id
8. Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36 [hereinafter EU Seal Products Ban].
9. Id. Within the legal framework of the European Union, the justification for action at the
EU level is that bans at the member state level could not have guaranteed effectiveness consistent with
the proper functioning of the internal market. Thus national bans on seal products, to be made effective,
would require measures to ensure that seal is not contained in products (such as fur apparel items)
flowing into those EU member states with bans from other member states where seal products are
permitted. Otherwise, bans by individual member states could easily be circumvented through
importation of seal products into member states without bans, where the seal products would be
processed into finished products and then exported to member states with bans on seal products. The
kinds of enforcement measures necessary to prevent such circumvention would clearly pose an obstacle
to commerce within the EU and interfere with the functioning of the internal market. Article 95 of the
EU treaty provides for such harmonization upward, to reconcile the legitimate policy objectives of
member states with the proper functioning of the internal market. Article 95 explicitly provides that
harmonization upward (i.e., to strictest member state standards) should be the norm in the case of
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concluded, based on an extensive investigation by the European Food Safety
Authority,' 0 that the methods typically used to kill and skin seals cause
significant and unnecessary pain and suffering." The European Union
determined that a ban on commercial seal products was appropriate because
seals are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and distress-which
justifies preventing unnecessary sufferingl 2-and because of public outcry
within Europe denouncing the treatment of seals as cruel and inhumane.' 3
Canada and Norway have two of the largest sealing industries
worldwide.14 In 2008, the year before the European ban, Canada exported
approximately CAD $2.5 million in seal products to the EU.15 Sealing also has
significant cultural importance for communities within Canada and Norway,
which may also have motivated their desire to challenge the European ban.
The WTO is a multilateral organization governing trade among nations,
based upon obligations its member states undertake through a series of
multilateral and plurilateral treaty instruments.16 The purpose of the WTO is
"the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and . . . the
elimination[] of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations." 7
More controversially, the WTO has become a vehicle for limiting regulatory
diversity in some areas of policy that are thought to affect the real value of the
market access created by the removal of direct barriers to trade.' 8 The WTO has
a complex legal regime regulating international trade, and countries that are
members of the WTO must abide by these rules. If they do not, they can be
brought before the WTO's dispute settlement process by other member states
"health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection." See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 114, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 52.
10. See Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare on a Request from the
Commission on the Animal Welfare Aspects of the Killing and Skinning of Seals, EUR. FOOD SAFETY
AUTHORITY J., Dec. 6, 2007 [hereinafter EFSA Report].
11. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
12. Id. pmbl. For further discussion of seals as sentient beings and the morality of killing such
creatures, see ANDREW LINZEY, WHY ANIMAL SUFFERING MATTERS (2009); and David M. Lavigne &
William S. Lynn, Canada's Commercial Seal Hunt: It's More than a Question of Humane Killing, 1 J.
ANIMAL ETHICS 1 (2011).
13. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, at 36.
14. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 24-122, 26-122.
15. Canada Threatens WTO Complaint over European Seal Product Ban, CBC NEWS (May 5,
2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2009/05/05/eu-seal-ban-505.html.
Indeed, the Canadian government has claimed that the European measure is likely to cost Canada CAD
$5.4 million per year. Lee Berthiaume, Norway To Join Canada in Challenging Seal Ban, EMBASSY
MAG. (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.embassymag.ca/dailyupdate/view/33.
16. What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis.e/whatis e.htm. A multilateral agreement is one accepted by all WTO member states,
whereas a plurilateral agreement is one adopted by some but not all WTO members. See Plurilaterals:
Of Minority Interest, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/
agrmlO e.htm.
17. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp-e/analytic-index-el
wto-agree_0 Ie.htm#p.
18. For a survey of the various arguments claiming that the WTO limits the ability of states to




for violating WTO law.19
Canada and Norway have initiated proceedings against the European
Union in the WTO dispute settlement process.20 They argue that the EU
measure violates the basic nondiscrimination obligations of WTO law, as well
as the provisions of some of the specialized WTO agreements.21 Further,
Canada and Norway contend that the trade restrictions imposed by the
European Union cannot be justified, under WTO law, by concerns about animal
22welfare. The European Union has contested Canada and Norway's claims. It
argues that the ban does not violate WTO law because it is nondiscriminatory
and is based on legitimate animal welfare concerns rather than the protection of
domestic markets. 23
The EU seal products ban is in part aimed instrumentally at improving
animal welfare outcomes, but it is based on a level of protection for the animals
that is also grounded in the ethical beliefs of the community in question with
regards to the nature of cruelty. The ban functions as an expression of moral
outrage at the treatment of the animals, enshrining the moral beliefs of
Europeans in legislation and prohibiting their complicity with cruelty through
the consumption of seal products within the European Union. The choice of the
ban as a policy instrument must be considered, we argue, in light of the fact
that both goals are sincere and important. While the physical and psychological
suffering of animals can be observed and understood scientifically, the animal
welfare movement is equally a response of moral revulsion to certain practices
in the treatment of animals, which are believed to be "cruel,"24 with many
cultural and religious dimensions affecting the perception of cruelty. Although
scientists can give a sense of the duration and intensity of animal suffering that
likely result from a given killing method, it is ultimately the predominant moral
beliefs of a particular society that will determine how much and what kinds of
suffering are acceptable or unacceptable to that society, and therefore the level
of protection it demands against animal suffering.
The perceived quantum of physical and psychological suffering of
animals is a crucial ingredient in the determination of cruelty, but it is not the
only one. The moral attitude with which the suffering is inflicted is enormously
important. The worst attitude is one of actual pleasure at the infliction of pain
on another sentient being, while an intention to inflict even intense suffering-
where unavoidable for purposes of human survival or meeting fundamental
human needs-may not be considered cruel. The European Union largely bans
the use of animals in cosmetics testing but does not do so in the case of medical
19. For a discussion of the WTO's dispute settlement process, see Understanding the WTO,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/disp Le.htm.
20. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Norway, European Communities-Measures
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing ofSeal Products, WT/DS401/5 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter
Norway's Panel Request]; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, European
Communities-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/4
(Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Canada's Panel Request].
21. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
22. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, 168, WT/DSB/M/293 (Feb. 24, 2011).
23. Id. 169.
24. See infra Part II.
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or pharmaceutical research; there may be a social consensus that a certain level
of suffering is unacceptably cruel where it is inflicted for the sake of producing
vanity goods like cosmetics, but not in order to develop lifesaving medications.
Spiritual beliefs about certain animals, the meaning invested in their particular
qualities, and the nature of their relation to humankind may also influence
ethical beliefs about what is cruel.
In sum, since the regulation of cruelty against animals is concerned both
with the effective protection of animals against physical and psychological
suffering, and also with the censure of a certain moral attitude, the instrumental
rationality typically deployed in WTO dispute settlement 26 to assess whether
trade restrictions motivated by values external to the trading system are
justified or permissible will be incapable of doing full justice to animal welfare.
In the case of animal welfare, it is necessary to address the legitimacy of both
instrumental and noninstrumental and expressive functions of law 2 7 in relation
to the trading system. This is largely a new challenge for the WTO, although
one that was already implicit in two disputes concerning the public morals
exception in WTO treaties.28 Nevertheless, as we shall show, in those disputes
the WTO sidestepped the real difficulty by regarding the moral considerations
at issue through an instrumental lens. Such reductionism is not possible in the
Seal Products dispute without fundamentally distorting the articulated basis for
the policies under scrutiny.
To sustain our claim that the WTO should permit trade-restrictive
measures rooted at least in part in noninstrumental rationality, this Article will
proceed in four Parts. In Part II, we consider the history of measures designed
to protect animal welfare in the European Union in order to show that these
moral concerns are deep-rooted and a common basis for legislation. We
demonstrate that animal welfare concerns have long been a genuine motivation
for legislation in a wide range of contexts and of European countries over an
25. In many societies, practices involving the killing of, or infliction of suffering on, animals
that have a close relationship to human society, such as dogs and cats, are particularly unacceptable.
Thus, the European Union has banned the importation, exportation, and marketing of cat and dog fur
and products. What one might call moral aesthetics-revulsion at the spectacle of killing certain animals
in certain ways-may contribute to our perception of what is "cruel." While the prevention of actual
physical or psychological suffering of animals is clearly a vital goal of animal welfare, the concern with
human moral attitudes has been central throughout the history of the regulation of cruelty to animals.
See infra Part II. The British essayist Thomas Macaulay famously observed that the Puritans hated bear-
baiting not because of the pain it gave to the bear, but because of the pleasure it gave to the spectators. I
THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE
SECOND 142 (Charles Harding Fifth ed., Macmillan & Co. 1913) (1848). Today animal welfare would
encompass both the harm to the animal and the moral harm to the spectators.
26. For a description of the typical WTO approach to justification of trade restrictive
measures, see infra Section IV.B.
27. For a discussion of the expressive function of law, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The
Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998); and Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong
with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2006).
28. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21,
2009) [hereinafter China-Publications andAudiovisual]; Appellate Body Report, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr.
7, 2005) [hereinafter US-Gambling].
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extended period of time; concern for animal welfare (and, by implication, other
noninstrumental moral beliefs) is not disguised protectionism or an immediate
response to some domestic producer lobby, but a genuine, longstanding
rationale for legislation. In particular, the European Union has often acted to
protect the welfare of seals.
Demonstrating the sincerity of the European Union's belief in the need to
protect animal welfare is important because it counters aspersions that the
measure is a pretext for protectionism or an arbitrary response to a passing
outburst of public sentiment. In Part III, we provide an overview of the current
Seal Products dispute at the WTO. We summarize the dispute, discuss the
nature and history of the EU measures that provoked the Canadian and
Norwegian complaints, and outline the broader factual record underlying the
dispute (including the history of sealing and the animal welfare concerns that
have dogged the industry). In doing so, we show the basis for the EU decision
to ban seal products. We demonstrate that the decision was rooted in widely-
held moral beliefs regarding the treatment of animals and justified by evidence
that seals are not hunted in a fashion considered by Europeans to be humane.
Having set out the rationale for the European action, we move on to
defend it (and, by implication, other morally motivated trade-restrictive
measures) in Part IV. We discuss the legal claims at issue in the Seal Products
dispute, respond to each of the claims made by Canada and Norway, and argue
that it is extremely difficult to make out a violation of WTO law. Further, we
argue that even if a violation of WTO law can be established, the EU action is
justified under the General Exceptions clause, which permits countries to
justify measures that would be otherwise in violation of WTO law but which
are taken for acceptable policy reasons. The European Union's action does not
violate WTO law, in light of its strong, ongoing commitment to animal welfare
and the even-handedness of the ban, which does not favor EU commercial
interests. We contend that sincere animal welfare concerns specifically (and
noninstrumental moral reasons more generally) are a legitimate rationale for
trade restrictive measures.
In Part V, we draw on the analysis in Parts III and IV to make some more
general conclusions about the types of justifications that are permissible in the
WTO, and about the WTO's institutional role more broadly. We argue that the
WTO should permit a pluralism of values when analyzing which justifications
for trade restrictive measures are permissible.
II. A HISTORY OF ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS
As background to the details of the legal issues at stake in the Seal
Products dispute discussed in Parts III and IV, this Part discusses animal
welfare concerns more generally to show that they are a well-established and
universally accepted ground for legislation in Europe, and that they have long
been a preoccupation of philosophical and religious thinking. We will then
show that animal welfare (and by implication other noninstrumental moral
beliefs) is not merely a protectionist or pretextual justification, but a serious
and sincere rationale for legislation. First, we discuss the broader European
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history of animal welfare protection and specific measures taken by European
countries to prevent cruelty to seals. Second, we sketch out the beliefs and
values underlying the animal welfare movement. The animal welfare
movement reflects a longstanding moral position that has resulted in significant
legislation designed to protect the wellbeing of animals. Third, we discuss the
history of the animal welfare movement, demonstrating that animal welfare
concerns have a lengthy lineage that has resulted in significant legislation. This
history explains how the current seal products ban is the result of Europe's
deeply rooted and evolving commitment to preventing cruelty to animals and
protecting public morals by prohibiting complicity in that cruelty. It is the latest
iteration of a decades-long quest effectively to prevent cruelty to seals and
express its moral unacceptability.
A. Europe's Previous Efforts To Protect Animal Welfare
The EU ban on seal products is part of a much broader European effort to
protect animal welfare. The European Union has "an extensive body of animal
welfare legislation," and many individual member states have passed even
more stringent rules.29 Most of these measures impose regulatory burdens on
Europe's own agriculture and fisheries activities and related economic
interests: it is far from the case that animal welfare has emerged in the EU as a
pretext for protectionism. The European Union has sought to protect "five
freedoms" for animals: freedom from discomfort; freedom from hunger and
thirst; freedom from fear and distress; freedom from pain, injury and disease;
and freedom to express natural behavior. 30 Since 1974, the European Union has
developed legislation to protect those freedoms for farm and wild animals
alike.3 1 The principle of animal welfare is thus a deep-rooted and basic precept
of European legislation. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon, which established the
European Union in its current form, enshrines the principle of animal welfare
as one of the goals of the Union:
In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport,
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the
Union and the member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full
regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative
or administrative provisions and customs of the member States relating in
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.32
The European Union has also developed general legislation on the
29. Harald Grethe, High Animal Welfare Standards in the EU and International Trade-How
To Prevent Potential "Low Animal Welfare Havens"?, 32 FOOD POL'Y 315, 317 (2006).
30. Animal Welfare-EU Action Plan, Evaluation and the Second Strategy on Animal Welfare
(Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Animal Welfare], available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/
actionplan/actionplan_en.htm.
31. European Commission, Directorates-General for Health and Consumers, EU Action Plan,
Evaluation and the Second Strategy on Animal Welfare (Mar. 7, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/food/
animal/welfare/actionplan-en.htm.
32. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 13,
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 54, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF.
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welfare of farm animals.33 Passed in 1998, EC Directive 98/58/EC provides
significant legislative protection, requiring farmers to minimize the pain and
suffering that farm animals experience. 34 Animals must be kept and bred in
verifiably humane conditions.35 Member states have reporting and enforcement
obligations to ensure that these requirements are met. 36 Other European
legislation regulates the transport of farm animals,37 protects animals at the
time of slaughter and killing,38 and regulates how animals used for scientific
experimentation should be treated.
The European Union has also passed legislation regarding the treatment
of specific farm and domesticated animals. For example, extensive legislation
has been passed concerning the treatment of pigs, 40 which mandates the precise
conditions in which they can be kept, including the size of pens.41 Conditions
for chickens kept for meat are strictly regulated.4 2 EU regulations dictate the
conditions in which layer hens can live, including the precise cage space per
layer hen. 3 Calves are given significant protection; the European Union
33. Commission Decision of 14 November 2006, 2006/778/EC, Amending Decision
2000/50/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 314) 39, Concerning Minimum Requirements for the Collection of
Information During the Inspections of Production Sites on Which Certain Animals Are Kept for
Farming Purposes; see also Council Directive 98/58/EC, of 20 July 1998 Concerning the Protection of
Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, 1998 OJ. (L 221) 23-27; European Convention for the Protection
of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, 1978 OJ. (L 323) 14-21; Council Decision 78/923/EEC, of 19
June 1978, Concerning the Conclusion of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept
for Farming Purposes, 1978 O.J. (L 323) 12, 13.
34. Council Directive 98/58/EC, of 20 July 1998, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 221) 24.
35. Id art. 4.
36. Id arts. 6-10.
37. There are four important pieces of legislation regulating the transport of farm animals:
Council Regulation 1/2005, of 22 December 2004, on the Protection of Animals During Transport and
Related Operations and Amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No.
1255/97, 2005 OJ. (L 3) 1; Council Decision 2004/544/EC, of 21 June 2004 on the Signing of the
European Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport (European
Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport); Commission Regulation (EC)
639/2003, of 9 April 2003, Laying down Detailed Rules Pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) 1254/1999
as Regards Requirements for the Granting of Export Refunds Related to the Welfare of Live Bovine
Animals During Transport, 2003 OJ. (L 93) 10; and Council Regulation 1255/97 of 25 June 1997
Concerning Community Criteria for Staging Points and Amending the Route Plan Referred to in the
Annex to Directive 91/628/EEC, 1997 O.J. (L 174) 1.
38. There are four important pieces of legislation regulating slaughter and killing: Council
Regulation 1099/2009, of 24 September 2009 on the Protection of Animals at the Time of Killing, 2009
O.J. (L 303) 1; Council Directive 93/119, of 22 December 1993 on the Protection of Animals at the
Time of Slaughter or Killing, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 21; European Convention for the Protection of Animals
for Slaughter, 1988 O.J. (L 137) 27; and Council Decision 88/306/EEC, of 16 May 1988 on the
Conclusion of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, 1988 O.J. (L 137)
25.
39. Directive 2010/63, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010
on the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes, 2010 O.J. (L 276) 33-79 (revising Directive
86/609/EEC).
40. Animal Welfare on the Farm-Pigs, EUROPA (Apr. 20, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/food/
animal/welfare/farm/pigs~en.htm.
41. Council Directive 2001/88, of 23 October 2001 Amending Directive 91/630/EEC Laying
Down Minimum Standards for the Protection of Pigs, 2001 O.J. (L 316) 1.
42. Council Directive 2007/43, of 28 June 2007 Laying Down Minimum Rules for the
Protection of Chickens Kept for Meat Production, 2007 O.J. (L 182) 19.
43. Council Directive 1999/74, of 19 July 1999 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the
Protection of Laying Hens, 1999 O.J. (L 203) 53.
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regulates the amount of light that calves are to receive while being raised.44 Cat
and dog fur is completely banned from sale in the European Union.4 5
EU legislation also protects nondomesticated animals. For example, 1991
legislation prohibited the use of leghold traps to capture wild animals as a
prima facie cruel method of entrapment.4 6 The extent to which wild animals
can be held in zoos and the conditions of their confinement are strictly
regulated.47 The European Cosmetics Directive 4 8 imposes a Europe-wide ban
on testing finished cosmetic products and ingredients on animals and on
marketing finished cosmetic products that have been tested on animals or that
contain ingredients that have been tested on animals.4 9
The European Union has consistently sought to improve its record on
animal welfare. It recently launched a feasibility study to create a European
Centre for the Protection and Welfare of Animals. In January 2012, it adopted
its second four-year Animal Welfare Strategy, following its successful
Community Action Plan on the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2006-10.51
In sum, the European Union is deeply committed to animal welfare. The
seal products ban is only one example of a plethora of initiatives designed to
preserve the "five freedoms" that Europeans feel are essential to animal
welfare.
The European Union has also previously acted to protect seals
specifically. Indeed, the most recent seal products ban is an extension of a
series of measures taken within Europe to protect seals from cruelty and loss of
population. 52
The first European legislation on trade in seal products was the 1983 Seal
Pups Directive.53 This legislation prohibited products derived from certain seal
pups (harp seals and hooded seals) from being imported to the European Union,
although there was an exception for products from traditional Inuit hunts.54 The
44. Council Directive 1991/629, of 19 November 1991 Laying Down Minimum Standards for
the Protection of Calves, 1991 O.J. (L 340) 28.
45. Regulation 1523/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December
2007 Banning the Placing on the Market and the Import to, or Export from, the Community of Cat and
Dog Fur, and Products Containing Such Fur, 2007 O.J. (L 343) 1.
46. Council Regulation 3254/91, of 4 November 1991 Prohibiting the Use of Leghold Traps
and the Introduction into the Community of Pelts and Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild Animal
Species Originating in Countries Which Catch Them by Means of Leghold Traps or Trapping Methods
Which Do Not Meet International Humane Trapping Standards, 1991 O.J. (L 308) 1.
47. Council Directive 1999/22, of 29 March 1999 Relating to the Keeping of Wild Animals in
Zoos, 1999 O.J. (L 94) 24-26.
48. Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Cosmetic Products, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 169.
49. For more information about the ban, see Cosmetic Products, EUROPA (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://europa.eullegislation-summaries/consumers/ product_1abelling and packaging/121191_en.htm.
50. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning
Trade in Seal Products, 8 COM (2008) 469 final (July 23, 2008) [hereinafter Proposal for a Regulation
Concerning Trade in Seal Products], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2009-0118&language=EN#titlel.
51. See Animal Welfare, supra note 30.
52. For a thorough discussion of Europe's animal welfare measures, see Thomas, supra note 1.




ban was extended several times during the 1980s due to increased public
pressure, and was eventually made permanent in 1989.
A number of conservation-oriented measures taken by the European
Union also sought to protect seal populations. In 1992, a Council Directive on
the conservation of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora provided
protections for all seal species in the European Community.5 6 The Directive
prohibited killing certain kinds of seals and prescribed the appropriate means
for hunting nonendangered seal species, so as to minimize the suffering of the
animals.57 The Council passed a similar regulation in 1996, implementing the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) and providing protections for certain seal species.58
The most recent seals regulation is the result of consultation and
deliberation that began in 2006. The European Parliament adopted a declaration
requesting that the European Commission draft legislation to ban the import,
export, and sale of all harp and seal products;59 the same year, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended to the
Committee of Ministers that Europe ban seal products taken in a cruel
manner. 60 This prompted the Commission to conduct an extensive analysis of
the "animal welfare aspects of seal hunting . . . [that] involved an examination
of regulatory frameworks and management practices for seal hunting and the
identification of best practices on the basis of scientific findings by the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)."6 1 The EFSA examined the seal
hunting practices of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Namibia, Norway,
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.62 Thus it was only
following an extensive scientific and regulatory analysis conducted over
several years that the European Union banned all seal products.
Before the Europe-wide ban was implemented, preempting national
legislative efforts, various European countries also contemplated or passed seal
product bans. Belgium and the Netherlands passed complete bans.63 Austria
55. Council Directive 89/370/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 163) 37; see also Background Information on
Seal Pups Directive, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal-welfare/
seals/index-en.htm (last updated Feb. 22, 2012).
56. Council Directive 92/43/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7.
57. Id Annex VI (a); see also The Habitats Directive, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/index-en.htm.
58. Council Regulation 338/97, 1997 O.J. (L 61) 1.
59. Written Declaration on Banning Seal Products in the European Union, European
Parliament (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.doc?
reference=p6 TA(2006)0369&language=EN.
60. The recommendation asked the Committee of Ministers "to ban all cruel hunting methods
which do not guarantee the instantaneous death, without suffering, of the animals, [and to] prohibit[] the
stunning of animals with instruments such as hakapiks, bludgeons, and guns." Eur. Par]. Ass.,
Recommendation 1776 (2006), Seal Hunting 1 13.1.2 (Nov. 17, 2006), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asplink=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ ERECl776.htm.
61. CITIZENS' SUMMARY, TRADE IN SEAL PRODUCTS 1 (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal-welfare/seals/pdf/citizen-summary.pdf. [
62. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 5-8.
63. For a description of the bans, see Assoc. Press, Canada Goes to WTO over Belgian, Dutch
Seal-Product Ban, CBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/
2007/09/26/sealwto.html; Canada Requests WTO Consultations on EU Seal Products Ban, FOREIGN
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banned the sale of seal products,6 as did Germany. In sum, European
countries, both at the EU and member state level, have a long history of acting
to protect seals from cruelty and population depletion. The current ban should
be understood as a continuation of that process.
B. Values Underlying the Animal Welfare Movement
The animal welfare philosophy motivating European legislation is
grounded in sincerely held religious and philosophical values. Each of the
Abrahamic religions expresses concern with cruelty to animals and has
prescribed certain methods of treatment and slaughter.66 Eastern religions, most
notably Jainism and Tibetan Buddhism, have also placed significant restrictions
on the slaughter and use of animals. 6 7 Philosophers beginning with the ancient
Greeks have debated the moral status of animals.68 Though Descartes argued
that animals are not objects of moral concern because they lack
consciousness, 69  Enlightenment philosophers criticized his position.70
Utilitarians and social reformers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
fought to reduce suffering for animals and humans alike, and drew awareness
to the cruel consequences of animal husbandry and other common practices.n
What has been termed the "new welfarism" 7 2 developed among philosophers in
the 1970s and 1980s, most notably Peter Singer.73 Its argument is often rooted
in utilitarianism, whereby the rightness or wrongness of an action is justified by
the pain or pleasure it produces. 74
Philosophers and religious groups have argued that the need to minimize
animal suffering is an important ethical principle. The concern of the animal
welfare movement has an intrinsic moral dimension to it; the movement is most
AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE CANADA (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.international.ge.calmediacommerce/
comm/news-communiques/2009/327.aspx?view-d.
64. Austria Votes To Ban Seal Products, INT'L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://www.infaw.org/uk/node/1502.
65. Press Release, Int'l Fund for Animal Welfare, German Parliament Votes Unanimously To
Ban Seal Product Imports (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-
release/german-parliament-votes-unanimously-to-ban-seal-product-imports-617604.htm.
66. Paul Waldau, Religion and Animals, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: THE SECOND WAVE 69,
72-77 (Peter Singer ed., 2006).
67. Id. at 72.
68. RICHARD RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION: CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS SPECIESISM
17(1989).
69. Tom Regan, Introduction, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 4-5 (Tom Regan
& Peter Singer eds., 1976).
70. See id. at 5 (noting that Voltaire and Hume, among others, "submit that there is as much
reason to believe that animals other than man think as there is for believing that man is able to do so").
71. See ANDREW LINZEY, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY (1990) (providing
excerpts from Mill and Bentham's writings on animal welfare).
72. GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 1 (1996) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER]; Gary L. Francione, Animal
Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 397, 399 (1996) [hereinafter Francione, Animal Rights
and Animal Welfare].
73. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975) (providing perhaps the most famous
exposition of the new welfarist position).
74. Elaine L. Hughes & Christiane Meyers, Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe, 6
ANIMAL L. 23, 32 (2000).
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concerned with cruelty to animals, and how cruelty is understood will depend
upon the complex of ethical, spiritual, and religious beliefs behind a particular
individual's or society's understanding of animal welfare. Some animal welfare
advocates are driven to minimize all suffering of animals to the extent possible,
whether imposed by the harsh realities of nature or human will; but most place
some emphasis on cruelty, the abolition of treatment of animals based upon
specific human moral attitudes, ranging from pure perversity-pleasure from
seeing an animal suffer-to commodification, the treatment of animals as if
they are morally meaningless beings whose place in the world can be reduced
to that of a commodity for limitless human exploitation.75 Others focus on the
degrading moral effect on the humans directly or indirectly implicated in such
cruelty.76
C. The Animal Welfare Movement and Resulting Legislation
The animal welfare movement is characterized by a concern for animal
suffering and the moral attitudes of humans in their relation to animals.7 7
Animal welfarists seek to protect animals from unnecessary cruelty, pain, and
suffering. Unlike the more modem and radical animal rights movement,
which argues that any killing and use of animals by humans is unacceptable,7 9
much of the animal welfare movement permits the (limited) subjugation of
animals to human needs.80 For an animal welfarist, it may be acceptable to kill
animals, provided that there is some basic human need or purpose served by
killing the animal and that the animal does not suffer unnecessarily.8 1 Animals
must be raised and kept in humane conditions, designed to minimize
suffering.82 As Gary Francione describes, animal welfarists seek the regulation
of animal exploitation, while animal rights activists seek its abolition.83
The United Kingdom has led the animal welfare movement. What would
75. For a description of the various aspects of the movement, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Introduction, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 4-5 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ANIMAL WELFARE 36-37, 47-57 (2d
ed. 2010); FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 1; HAROLD D. GUITHER, ANIMAL
RIGHTS: HISTORY AND SCOPE OF A RADICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT 9 (1998); Francione, Animal Rights
and Animal Welfare, supra note 72, at 397; Robert Gamer, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, I J.
ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 162 (2006). There is, of course, significant variation among members of the
animal welfare movement. See, e.g., GUITHER, supra, at 11 (describing various strains of animal
welfarism).
78. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 1; GUITHER, supra note 77, at 9.
79. This categorization of animal welfare versus animal rights is controversial, and has been
most notably advocated by Francione. See FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at I
(distinguishing between animal rights and animal welfare). Many modem activists who consider
themselves to be concerned with animal rights are not abolitionists. Nevertheless, we adopt Francione's
approach for ease and conceptual clarity.
80. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 1; GUITHER, supra note 77, at 9.
Note, though, that the distinction between the welfare and rights movements is porous. See FRANCIONE,
RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 2.
81. Garner, supra note 77, at 162.
82. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, supra note 72, at 16.
83. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 1.
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become the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)
84was founded in London in 1824. Parliament passed the first anticruelty law in
1822.85 An 1835 act of Parliament sought to consolidate and amend the current
laws on animal cruelty, and the 1911 Protection of Animals Act (still in force in
Britain) was based on the animal welfarist principle that it is wrong for animals
to suffer unnecessarily. 6 One of the first laws regulating experimentation on
animals was passed in 1876; the Act was updated in 1986 to provide even
greater protections.88 The 1965 Brambell Committee, composed of scientists
and concerned citizens, recommended practices for farming and husbandry to
prevent cruelty to animals (particularly poultry, cattle, and swine), which were
then used by animal welfare supporters to demand greater legislative change.89
As Harold Guither notes, the Brambell Report is "cited frequently as the
landmark standard for farm animal welfare,"90 spawning reform in other
European countries.91
Other European countries have also implemented extensive animal
welfare legislation. Denmark has enacted legislation prohibiting the use of
animals for teaching purposes.92 Germany prohibits testing weapons,
cosmetics, and tobacco on animals.93 France passed its first anticruelty
legislation in 1850.94
Finally, there is a broader global legislative movement intended to
prevent the cruel treatment of animals. The World Organisation for Animal
Health, the leading international organization devoted to promoting animal
health,95 has adopted extensive measures devoted to preventing cruelty to
animals, including standards regulating the slaughter of animals.96 More
84. GUITHER, supra note 77, at 2; ROD PREECE & LORNA CHAMBERLAIN, ANIMAL WELFARE
& HUMAN VALUES 34 (1993).
85. Hughes & Meyers, supra note 74, at 25.
86. See id. at 25-26.
87. PREECE & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 84, at 87. As the authors note, the Act was
"remarkably progressive" for its time, requiring the use of anesthesia and other limitations. Id.
88. Id. at 88.
89. GUITHER, supra note 77, at 2.
90. Id
91. The United States has also exhibited a long-standing concern for animal welfare. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony's 1641 legal code protected domestic animals from cruelty. FRANCIONE,
RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, supra note 72, at 7. In 1822, a New York court found that wanton cruelty to
an animal was a common law misdemeanor. Id. at 7. Groups seeking to prevent cruelty to animals were
formed as early as 1866. GUITHER, supra note 77, at 4. The American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1866. The nineteenth century also saw the creation of many other
such societies, including the American Humane Association (1877), the Animal Rescue League of
Boston (1889), and the American Anti-Vivisection Society (1883). Id. Efforts to prevent cruelty to
animals have resulted in the Wild Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649 (1971), the
federal Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966), and the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862 (1958), among others.
92. PREECE & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 84, at 91.
93. Id
94. Hughes & Meyers, supra note 74, at 26.
95. Objectives, WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (2012), http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=
53#c203.
96. WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE (2011),
available at http://www.grandin.com/OIE.Terrestrial.Animal.Welfare.Guideline.1.7.5.pdf. For an
analysis of the standards see A. Shimshony & M.M. Chaudry, Slaughter of Animals for Human
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particularly, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), a
component of the Antarctic Treaty System, requires that the killing of seals be
quick and painless.9 7 The treaty reflects longstanding concerns of members of
the international community (including European countries) concerning the
manner in which seals are killed.
III. THE CURRENT SEAL PRODUCTS DISPUTE
Having established that animal welfare has long been a genuine ground
for European regulation, we move on to discuss the specifics of the EU ban on
seal products. Before analyzing the legal claims of the parties and arguing that
the European Union should prevail, this Part will provide a background to the
current Seal Products dispute at the WTO. We summarize the dispute between
Canada, Norway, and the EU, describe the EU measures, and elaborate on the
factual record, describing the sealing industry in detail. In doing so, we show
the basis upon which the EU decision to ban seal products was made. We
conclude that the decision was rooted in a long, evolving tradition of moral
beliefs and justified by the ample evidence that seals are not hunted in a fashion
that Europeans consider humane. The decision was not tainted by protectionism
or favoritism towards particular WTO members; it was even-handed and is part
of animal welfare measures that have imposed significant costs on commercial
interests within the European Union itself. It was a bona fide attempt to give
meaning to widely shared European beliefs about the status of these animals
and the ways in which they can be treated.
A. Summary of the Dispute
This section will discuss the history of the seal products disputes between
the sealing countries and Europe. First, we present the background to the WTO
dispute. Second, we discuss the efforts taken by sealing proponents in
European courts to quash the ban.
The current WTO seal products dispute arose after the EU Parliament and
Council adopted a regulation banning the marketing and importing of seal
products on September 16, 2009.98 The ban was passed by an overwhelming
majority-550 of 736 members of the European Parliament.99 This ban
preempted the prior bans on seal products by Belgium and the Netherlands. 00
Canada, a country with one of the world's largest sealing industries, 01 had
previously requested WTO consultations on the Belgian and Dutch bans.'0 2
Consumption, 24 Sa. & TECH. REV. OFF. INT. DES EPlZOOTIES 293 (2005).
97. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175.
98. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
99. HSI Canada Exposes Seal Hunt Cruelty During Canada-EU Trade Talks, HUMANE Soc'Y
INT'L (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.hsi.org/world/canada/news/releases/2011/04/trade-talks_screen_
04121 1.html.
100. Simon Lester, The WTO Seal Products Dispute: A Preview of the Key Legal Issues, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Jan. 13, 2010, at 1, 4 n.2, available at http://www.asil.org/files/insightl00113pdf.pdf
(discussing how the Europe-wide ban preempted the previous Belgian and Dutch measures).
101. For a discussion of the market supply for seal products, see infra Section IlI.C.
102. Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities-Certain Measures
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When the Europe-wide ban was established, Canada and Norway (another
country with a significant sealing industry) moved quickly to file separate
requests for consultations. 0 3 Consultations were held with Canada and Norway
on December 15, 2009.104
Following the consultations, the European Union developed
implementing legislation to effectuate the ban. 05 Soon after, Canada and
Norway requested supplementary consultations with the European Union.106
These were held on December 1, 2010, and failed to resolve the dispute. 0 7
After the second round of consultations failed, Canada and Norway both
requested that the WTO establish a panel to adjudicate the issue. os The WTO's
Dispute Settlement Understanding governs the process by which member states
can sue for alleged violations of WTO law.109 Countries must first attempt to
work out the disagreement through consultations;"l0 if these fail, they can
request that the WTO establish an ad hoc panel to adjudicate the dispute."'
Since consultations between Canada, Norway, and the European Union had
failed to resolve the dispute, Canada and Norway were permitted to request that
a panel be formed.
On March 25, 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)ll2 decided to
establish a panel to resolve the dispute between Canada and the European
Union. The DSB then later decided to merge the Canadian and Norwegian
complaints, and to have one panel address both disputes." 3 At the time of
printing, however, the panelists have not yet been selected, and a resolution to
the dispute is likely to take at least a year.114
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS369/1 (Oct. 1, 2007). WTO
consultations initiate the WTO dispute settlement process. For a further description of the dispute
settlement procedure, see infra Section IV.A.
103. Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities-Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing ofSeal Products, WT/DS400/1 (Nov. 4, 2009); Request for Consultations by
Norway, European Communities-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products, WT/DS401/1 (Nov. 10, 2009).
104. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20 (stating that the consultations took place on Dec.
15, 2009); Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20 (same).
105. Commission Regulation 737/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 216) 1 (laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of Regulation 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36).
106. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
107. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
108. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
109. Dispute Settlement Understanding, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, art. 1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispue/dsu e.htm.
110. Id. art. 4.
111. Id. arts. 4.7, 6.
112. The DSB is the arm of the WTO dealing with dispute settlement issues, in which all
member states are represented and have a vote. For a discussion of how the DSB operates, see
Understanding the WTO: Setting Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tife/ disple.htm
113. WTO Establishes Panel in Seals Case, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/newsl l.e/dsb_21aprl l.e.htm.
114. The WTO's website on the Seal Products dispute indicates that the panel has been
"established, but not yet composed," as of April 21, 2011. European Communities-Measures
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012),
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It is worth noting that there was also an unsuccessful challenge to the EU
measure in European courts, and there remains a further active challenge to the
detailed regulation implementing the indigenous exception.,15 A group of Inuit
bands, aboriginal individuals, and industry associations (such as the Fur
Institute of Canada and the Canadian Seal Marketing Group) from Canada,
Norway, and Iceland brought an initial action at the European General Court on
January 11, 2010, seeking interim measures to lift the European seal products
ban and challenging the legislation on several grounds." 6 They argued that the
ban violated Europe's obligations towards indigenous peoples under
international law, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR), and the First Additional Protocol to
the ECHR, which safeguards, among other things, property rights and the right
to respect for private life." 7 They also argued that interim measures suspending
the ban should be granted because of the immediate harm that would be visited
on the Inuit communities should the ban be permitted to stand."'8 The President
of the Court rejected these arguments due to lack of urgency, and the suit was
thrown out."' 9 An appeal has been filed. 120
Three months after their first petition was rejected, the petitioners filed a
second suit for interim measures in European court, alleging that there were
"new facts" that had emerged following the first unsuccessful action, which
made interim measures necessary.121 These "new facts" were the market effects
of the European ban, which, the petitioners alleged, had already begun to harm
the Inuit communities.122 The court rejected the second petition on the grounds
that the petitioners had not produced sufficient evidence of actual individual
injury. 123
B. Purpose, Design, and Structure of the European Measure
Before exploring the legal claims at stake in the Seal Products dispute, it
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases~e/ds40 1e.htm.
115. Court documents are not yet available in the current challenge, C-583/1 I P - Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, and the appeal from the prior decision, T-18/10 RH-
INTP,- Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council (2010). Documents are available
as they emerge at Case-Law of the Court of Justice, INFOCURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=18/10&td=ALL (last visited April 11, 2012).
116. See Order of the President of the General Court, 9, Case T-18/10 R (Apr. 30, 2010)
(describing the initial filing by the petitioners).
1 17. Id.] 149-62.
118. Id1196-103.
119. Id. J 114-117,
120. Order of the President of the General Court, 9, Case T-18/10 R 11, Inuit Tapiriit
Konotami and Others v Parliament and Council (Oct. 25, 2010) (noting that no appeal was filed at that
time); Order of the General Court, Case T-18/10 REC, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament
and Council (Dec. 6, 2011) (appearing to appeal this order).
121. Order of the President of the General Court, 13, Case T-18/10 R II.
122. Id 129-50.
123. Id J 61-93. The European Union has strict standing rules for when an individual seeks to
challenge an EU legislative act, as opposed to regulatory decisions or implementing administration
actions. The applicants did not meet these restrictive rules, because the effect of the legislation on them
was both indirect and of a general nature-i.e., not distinguishable from the possible economic effects
on others caught by the law. Id.
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is essential to understand the nature of the EU measures at issue. In this
Section, we discuss the specifics of the European ban of seal products. We
describe the moral and philosophical rationale behind the measure, using the
legislative history to show that the ban was adopted for ethical reasons. We also
show that the current measure was adopted after more limited legislation was
found to be inadequate to prevent cruelty.
The World Organisation for Animal Health has stipulated that "animal
welfare standards should be democratically and transparently adopted and both
science and ethics based, bearing in mind the production systems and uses of
animals of each Member and the relevant environmental, regional, geographic,
economic, cultural and religious aspects." 2 4 Our discussion of the legislative
history will demonstrate that the EU seal ban meets all of the desiderata in this
recommendation of the World Organisation for Animal Health.
In demonstrating that the EU decision was rooted in long-held moral
beliefs regarding the treatment of animals and justified by ample evidence, we
aim to ground our argument in later Parts that such noninstrumental
justifications for trade-restrictive measures should be considered legitimate
under WTO law. Appreciating the moral grounds for a regulation of this kind
confirms the limits of science and instrumental policy reasoning in deciding a
dispute of this nature.
The European ban on seal products consists of a prohibition on trade in
seal products within the European Union, including importation or sale. The
ban extends to any and all products derived from sealsl 2 5 and prohibits the sale
of seal products within the European Union.126 This means that "transit trade"
products-those that do not enter the EU market before being reexported-are
not affected by the regulation.127 This is consistent with the concern of the
measure with the morality of consumer behavior within the European Union.
The ban also only affects products placed on the market after the regulation
was implemented, reflecting general legal notions of non-retroactivity of
legislation. 128
Three exceptions to the ban limit its scope. First, the EU measure allows
for the import and sale of seal products that result from traditional hunts
"conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities [that] contribute to their
subsistence."l 2 9 This means that the ban excludes subsistence hunting by
members of aboriginal and indigenous communities.' 30 The measure specifies
124. WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
125. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art. 2.2 (defining seal products).
126. Id. arts. 2.3, 3.1 (prohibiting "introducing [seal products] onto the Community market,
thereby making available to third paties, in exchange for payment").
127. See DEP'T FOR ENVT., FOOD & RURAL AFF., WELFARE OF ANIMALS: REGULATION (EC)
1007/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON TRADE IN SEAL PRODUCTS: THE
SEAL PRODUCTS REGULATION 2010: GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 4 (Aug.
2010) [hereinafter DEFRA, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE], available at http://archive.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-
pets/wildlife/protect/documents/201 Oseal-regs-guidance.pdf.
128. Id.
129. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art. 3.1.
130. Note that while "Inuit" is defined in the measure, "indigenous" is not. As we discuss
below, this may mean that communities which engage in traditional, subsistence hunting may be eligible
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that this exception is meant to ensure compliance with the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,13 1 which protects the rights of
indigenous communities to live by traditional means. The implementing
legislation further specifies the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order
for this exception to be invoked:'32 (1) the sealing must be conducted by
indigenous communities with a tradition of sealing; (2) the seals killed in the
hunt must be at least partly "used, consumed, or proceeded in the community
according to their traditions"; and (3) the seal hunt must contribute to the
subsistence of the indigenous community. 33 In order to verify that these
conditions are met, hunters must ensure that an "attesting document" is
provided when the product is introduced to the European market.134
The second exception permits the importation of goods purchased abroad
by travelers for casual or noncommercial use, 135 as long as the regulation's goal
is not compromised. This exception can be invoked in one of three ways.
European residents who travel abroad can bring back seal products on their
person or in their luggage.136 An individual moving to the EU can bring seal
products along with his other personal property.' 37 And European residents
who travel abroad and purchase seal products can ship them home, provided
that the products are accompanied by adequate documentation demonstrating
their origin.138 This exception insures that European nationals are not punished
for consumption decisions that were legal in the territory where the purchase
took place. In general, it is easier to reconcile regulation with the territorial
principle of jurisdiction when the regulated transaction occurs within the
territory of the EU, even if the regulation is concerned with events that take
place outside that territory. By permitting importation of goods purchased
abroad by travelers that are not brought into the stream of commerce within the
EU, the regulation thus makes a legitimate distinction, grounded in an
understanding of the desirable or acceptable degrees of extraterritoriality in EU
regulation.
Taken together, the traveler's importation exception and the non-
applicability of the regulation to transshipment, ensure that only where seal
products are sold or destined for sale within the European Union are legal
sanctions applied, even though the regulatory intervention is prompted by
events that take place outside the European Union (i.e., the cruel slaughter of
seals). This reflects the spirit and letter of the territoriality principle as it is
understood in EU law, based upon the European Court of Justice's
to sell seals into the EU under this exception. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
131. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, $ 14; European Commission Regulation (EU)
737/2010, art. 2.1, 2010 O.J. (L 216) 2 [hereinafter EU Implementing Legislation].
132. EU Implementing Legislation, supra note 131, art. 3.
133. Id
134. Id. art. 3.2; see also id. arts. 6-10 (providing further details of how attesting documents
must be prepared and presented).
135. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art. 3.2(a); EU Implementing Legislation, supra note
131, art. 2.2.
136. EU Implementing Legislation, supra note 131, art. 4.1.
137. Id. art. 4.2.
138. Id. art. 4.3.
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interpretation of customary international law.139
Third, seal products that are a result of hunting conducted for the
sustainable management of marine resources can be placed on the market on a
not-for-profit basis,14 0 so long as the regulation is not undermined.141 Seal
products eligible for this exception must meet three criteria: (1) they must be
hunted in conjunction with a "national or regional natural resources
management plan which uses scientific population models of marine resources
and applies the ecosystem-based approach;"' 4 2 (2) the hunt cannot exceed the
total allowable catch specified in the resource management program;14 3 and (3)
the resulting seal products must be sold in a nonsystematic, not-for-profit
fashion.144 In order to demonstrate that these three criteria are met, the products
must be accompanied by a document attesting to that fact.145 The third
exception is based on a regulatory distinction that is grounded in the objective
of responsible and sustainable resource management. At the same time, it is
carefully designed in such a way that the pursuit of this legitimate objective
does not compromise the moral thrust of the overall ban. Thus, for this
exception to apply, the resulting products must be sold in a nonsystematic, not-
for-profit fashion. Sustainable resource management cannot be an excuse for
commercial exploitation of the suffering of the seals that would detract from
the fundamental noninstrumental purpose of the measure.
The regulation was designed to be enforced by EU member states, which
are responsible for establishing penalties and processes sufficient to implement
the seal products ban.146 Members must notify the Commission of the measures
taken to implement the ban,147 and must provide the Commission with a report
on the measures taken every four years.148
139. Thus, applying the territoriality principle, the European Court of Justice has held that in
responding to the effects of fishing activities outside the European Union that are contrary to its
conservation policies, the European Union is limited to legal sanctions that can be applied within the
territory of the European Union. Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden [Public Prosecutor] v. Peter
Michael Poulsen, 1992 E.C.R. 1-6019, $$ 33-34. In theory, this would allow the EU to ban transshipment
within the letter of the territoriality principle, as the goods would be turned back at the borders of the
EU; but the effect would be to prohibit purchases and sales of seal products outside the territory of the
EU, by precluding the goods from reaching the non-EU destination where the processing or ultimate
consumption takes place and thus making their sale in that non-EU jurisdiction impossible or at least
considerably more costly, if not prohibitively so (as alternative shipping routes would have to be found).
This would seem to go some distance in undermining the spirit of the territoriality principle, and would
not be justified by the noninstrumental purpose of protecting public morals within the EU. For the
application of the territoriality principle in EU law generally, see Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of
America and Others, 2011, $ 129, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search case
366/10).
140. EU Implementing Legislation, supra note 131, art. 2.2.
141. Id. art. 3.2(b).
142. Id. art. 5.1 (a).
143. Id. art. 5.1(b).
144. Id. art. 5.1(c).
145. Id. art. 5.2; see also id. arts. 6-10 (providing further details of how attesting documents
must be prepared and presented).
146. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art. 6 (penalties must be "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive").
147. Id.
148. Id. art 7.1.
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The text of the regulation and its implementing legislation, as well as the
legislative and drafting history, make clear that the overall purpose of the
regulation is to protect animal welfare-to prevent unnecessary cruelty to seals,
to promote humane treatment, and to establish the appropriate moral attitude to
the treatment of animals with the European Union. The text of the seal products
ban sets out this goal explicitly.149 The premise of the regulation is that seals
are "sentient beings that can experience pain, distress, fear and other forms of
suffering," and therefore are in need of protection from cruel treatment. 50 The
preamble further explains that while it may be possible to kill seals in a way
that minimizes their suffering, it is impossible for the European Union to verify
that seals were, in fact, killed in a humane way.1 ' The European Union
therefore decided to adopt a full ban after carefully considering the alternatives
(including labeling) and deeming them insufficient, because they were not
adequate to ensure that products from seals killed in an inhumane way would
not find their way onto the EU market, thus raising the possibility that the
behavior of EU consumers on EU territory would be complicit with this
cruelty. 152
The legislative history of the EU measure also makes this purpose clear.
The Commission established the seal ban because of "growing public concern
about the animal welfare aspects of the killing and skinning of seals . .. the
Commission . . . received massive numbers of letters and petitions expressing
deep indignation about the trade in seal products." 5 This expression of public
opinion on the ethics of the seal trade drove the EU action; 154 "[g]iven the
animal welfare concerns expressed by the public, notably by the European
Parliament and member states, standalone nonlegislative measures are not
considered sufficient to address the issue."155 All of the legislative documents
149. Id. pmbl.
150. Id.
151. "Although it might be possible to kill and skin seals in such a way as to avoid unnecessary
pain, distress, fear, or other forms of suffering, given the conditions in which seal hunting occurs,
consistent verification and control of hunters' compliance with animal welfare requirements is not
feasible in practice or, at least, is very difficult to achieve in an effective way, as concluded by the
European Food Safety Authority . . . ." Id. $ 11; see also Nielsen, supra note 1, at 10 ("The most
important point to note is that the EU regulation does not aim to give seals a 'right to life'. Rather, the
policy is based on the rationale that although it may be possible to kill seals in a humane manner, most
frequently this does not happen.").
152. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8. For a further discussion of the history of the measure
and why labeling was not found to be an adequate alternative, see Proposal for a Regulation Concerning
Trade in Seal Products, supra note 50.
153. Citizens' Summary: Trade in Seal Products, supra note 61.
154. Through the public consultation process established to assess public opinion on the seal
hunt, the Commission received "73,153 answers ... from citizens in 160 . . . countries worldwide."
These responses showed "massive dissatisfaction with current seal hunting practices . . . . A clear
majority of respondents in nearly all the geographical areas analysed preferred a ban." Accompanying
Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning
Trade in Seal Products, Impact Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document, EUR. PARL. DOc.
COM (2008) 469 final (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter Impact Assessment], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:2290:FIN:EN:PDF.
155. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council Concerning Trade in Seal Products, Summary of the Impact Assessment, Commission
Staff Working Document, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 2008) 469 final (July 7, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal-welfare/seals/pdf/ia-summary en.pdf.
2012] 387
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 367
associated with the ban indicate that the overall motivation was to respond to
widely held ethical beliefs about the cruelty of the hunt, both by attempting to
reduce the suffering of the seals and by expressing moral outrage at the
practices of the commercial hunters.156
As mentioned above, the legislative history also clarifies why the
European Union thought that a ban was necessary, rather than a more limited
measure. The original proposal to regulate the seal trade suggested banning
only seal products that were the result of seals being killed in an inhumane
manner. 157 However, an extensive scientific and regulatory analysis conducted
by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which suggested that it would
be difficult to distinguish between seals killed humanely and those killed in a
cruel fashion, prompted the European Union to expand on its initial proposal
and to institute a full ban. This process was transparent, democratic, and both
science- and ethics-based.
There are several reasons why the European Union found that it is
difficult to distinguish between seals killed humanely and those killed cruelly.
First, it is hard to assess when an animal has been humanely killed, as it can be
difficult to monitor when the animals lose consciousness. 159 Even if there is a
stringent standard in place to ensure that an animal does not suffer
unnecessarily when it is killed, it can be very difficult to implement the
requisite techniques. Seals are hunted rapidly in dangerous conditions on ice
floes, where they are skinned shortly after.160 Hunters often cannot and do not
take the time to ensure that the animals have been properly killed.' 6' Second,
there is a "lack of objective data" on humane killings; the individuals collecting
data on whether seals are humanely killed are self-interested, and therefore
their assessment cannot be trusted.162 Third, individuals may differ in what they
think is cruel. While the Canadian regulations, for example, do not include the
separation of seal pups from their mothers as cruelty, the EU scientific
assessment of the treatment of seals suggests that this could be considered cruel
treatment, due to the trauma that it inflicts; this conclusion corresponds to
widely held moral intuitions among Europeans about what is cruel. 6 1
Clearly, the concern was not just lack of effective monitoring or
156. Id "In line with its commitment to high animal welfare standards, the European
Commission undertook to conduct an objective, in-depth analysis of the animal welfare aspects of seal
hunting in sealing countries." Id. at 2; see also Proposal for a Regulation Concerning Trade in Seal
Products, supra note 50, at 2 ("For several years, many members of the public have been concerned
about the animal welfare aspects of the killing and skinning of seals and about trade occurring in
products possibly derived from seals that have been killed and skinned with avoidable pain, distress, and
other forms of suffering, which seals, as sentient mammals, are capable of experiencing. Those concerns
have therefore been expressed by members of the public out of ethical reasons. The Commission
received during the last years a massive number of letters and petitions on the issue expressing citizens'
deep indignation and repulsion regarding the trade in seal products in such conditions.").
157. Proposal for a Regulation Concerning Trade in Seal Products, supra note 50, at 5.
158. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 88.
159. Id at 3, 39, 42, 44, 47.
160. LINZEY, supra note 12, at 115-29 (describing the problems with "regulated" seal hunts).
161. Id.
162. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 3-4.
163. Id. at 77.
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enforcement of Canada's and Norway's standards; Europeans, as represented
by their parliamentarians, require a higher level of protection for animal
welfare than do the citizens of Canada and Norway. While the beliefs of
Canadians as a whole may not be significantly different from those of
Europeans,'" the political sensitivity and importance of the region in Canada
where the hunt occurs has made the attitudes in that region essentially the basis
for Canadian policy. The ban does not arise solely out of a dispute over how to
achieve a given level of protection effectively, but rather reflects a
disagreement on the level of protection that is required based on the moral
convictions of society. Canada and Norway simply cannot agree with the level
of protection called for by European values.1 65
This is evident in the legislative history, which reveals how other less
restrictive measures, such as labeling, voluntary measures, or member state
legislative objectives were considered and rejected by the European
Parliament 16 because they did not sufficiently meet the public demand for a
more extensive measure:
Labeling alone of seal products is not an alternative to a ban on trade in those
products as labeling would only be relevant to assuage the ethical animal
welfare concerns of citizens and consumers as and when the killing and
skinning methods in force in the sealing countries would accord with the
criteria provided for in this Regulation. There should therefore be incentives for
sealing countries to adapt their legislation and practice to that effect, which can
only be achieved by means of trade prohibitions.' 67
The European Commission also carefully considered the market and trade
effects of the regulation. It conducted a detailed impact assessment of the
projected market effects, predicting which countries would be economically
harmed by a ban.168 Notably, this included effects on EU member states such as
Denmark and Italy that incur significant benefits from processing seal
products.169 The European Union also noted the potential economic effects on
fur-producing countries both inside and outside the European Union-i.e., on
Canada and Norway, as well as on EU seal producers such as Finland and the
United Kingdom.170
The legislative history also reveals the reasons behind the indigenous
hunt exception. First, European lawmakers were genuinely concerned about
164. See, e.g., Nation-Wide Poll Shows Canadians Continue To Oppose Seal Hunt, INT'L FUND
FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (July 1, 2010), http://www.ifaw.org/ca/node/22521; New Poll Shows Most
Europeans Say 'NO' to Cruelty from Canada, HUMANE Soc'Y INT'L (July 14, 2011),
http://www.hsi.org/world/ europe/news/releases/2011/07/eu-poll-supportsjban_071411 .html.
165. For a further discussion of why labeling was not a reasonable alternative, see Xinjie Luan
& Julien Chaisse, Preliminary Comments on the WTO Seal Products Dispute: Traditional Hunting,
Public Morals and Technical Barriers to Trade, 22 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 79, 110-11
(2001).
166. Proposal for a Regulation Concerning Trade in Seal Products, supra note 50, at 11-12
(considering and rejecting labeling).
167. Id. at 12.
168. Impact Assessment, supra note 154, at 31-47.
169. Id. at 35-36.
170. Id. at 28-42.
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inflicting grave harm on the Inuit way of life. 17 1 The animal welfarist theory
underlying the seal products ban is based on the longstanding principlel72 that
animals should be protected from cruelty as much as possible, but this does not
mean that animal needs do not have to be balanced against human needs. The
Inuit should not be forced to abandon their traditional way of life to protect
seals. The importance of protecting traditional cultures was sufficient to justify
an exception for traditional hunts. 73
Second, the European Union felt compelled to allow this exception
because of its international law commitments, including the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.' 7 4 The Declaration requires that indigenous
peoples be allowed to continue to subsist using traditional methods, and EU
legislators did not want to violate this right. Both the indigenous exception and
the sustainable management exception reflect an important dimension of the
moral attitude that is expressed and supported by the EU scheme: a particular
distaste for suffering inflicted on animals for reasons of large-scale commercial
exploitation, which animal welfare or rights activists often call
"commodification,"' 75 and greater tolerance for suffering inflicted for purposes
related to important social values, rather than the maximization of commercial
profit. The European Union sought to ensure that exceptions based on
regulatory distinctions connected to other legitimate purposes, such as the
protection of indigenous peoples and sustainable resource management, did not
undermine the fundamental moral thrust of the ban as a noninstrumental
measure.
C. Facts Underlying the WTO Dispute
Before analyzing the legal claims made by Canada and Norway, it is
important to have a clear sense of the facts underlying the WTO dispute. This
Section will provide a brief overview of the sealing industry, a description of
the animal welfare concerns associated with sealing, and a discussion of
measures that other countries have taken to address this issue.
More than 900,000 seals are hunted annually worldwide. The most
significant hunts take place in Canada, Greenland, and Namibia," but sealing
also occurs in Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, the United Kingdom
(Scotland), and the United States (in Alaska and largely for subsistence
171. See id. at 18.
172. See supra Part II.
173. Proposal for a Regulation Concerning Trade in Seal Products, supra note 50, at 5 ("The
fundamental economic and social interests of Inuit communities traditionally engaged in the hunting of
seals should not be adversely affected.").
174. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
175. GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE: ABOLITION OR
REGULATION? 63 (2010).
176. LINZEY, supra note 12, at 115; EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 19.
177. LINZEY, supra note 12, at 147. Canada is the largest single producer of seal products. The
Total Allowable Catch (TAC), or number of seals permitted to be caught in a single year, was 330,000
in 2010, approximately one-third of the global catch. Frequently Asked Questions About Canada's Seal




purposes). 178 Seal processing occurs in these and other countries, including
Italy and Denmark.
The types of seals hunted vary by region. The Canadian hunt largely
targets harp seals; some hooded seals and a few grey seals are also killed each
year.179 'The Norwegian hunt focuses on both harp and hooded seals, while
ringed and harp seals are the most important species caught in Greenland. 80 By
contrast, the hunt in Namibia is largely of cape fur seals.' 81
Seals are killed through a variety of methods. The traditional Norwegian
hakapik, a club with a metal spike, is commonly used in Canada.' 82 The spike
is used to stun or crush the seal's skull. Clubs are also used in Namibia, to
similar effect as the hakapik. Firearms are used in the Canadian, Norwegian,
and Namibian hunts.'83 Underwater netting and trapping, where seals are
drowned to death underwater, is conducted in Canada, Greenland, Iceland,
Russia, and the United States.' 84
All of these methods of sealing have long been controversial from an
animal welfare perspective. Hunting using the hakapik or club can result in
nearly instantaneous death for seals, particularly for young seals with soft
skulls who move less swiftly, if sufficient blows are administered appropriately
to the head to crush the skull and destroy both cerebral hemispheres and
calvaria.s8 5 The problem, according to the European Union and other critics, is
that blows are often not administered effectively. If the first blow does not hit
the calvaria but rather another part of the body, or if it hits only one side of the
skull, the seal will experience significant pain.'8 Further, reports show that
sealers do not take efforts to ensure that the seals are actually dead; they strike
the seals until they are disabled and cannot move and then pursue other seals,
leaving the seals in intense suffering.'8 Further, sealers do not always wait for
the seals to die before skinning them (indeed, the Canada Marine Mammal
Regulation requires only brain death, not a complete cessation of functioning,
for skinning to commence).' 88 There is significant evidence to suggest that
seals are skinned alive, particularly in the Canadian hunt, where there is no
requirement that a "blink test" (or other test) be administered to ensure that the
seal is dead before skinning begins. 89
178. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 14-19, 33.
179. Frequently Asked Questions About Canada's Seal Harvest, supra note 177.
180. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 26, 29.
181. Id.at 30.
182. Id. at 37-38; see Frequently Asked Questions About Canada's Seal Harvest, supra note
177 (noting that Canadians use a modified version of the traditional hakapik).
183. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 24, 42-45. Firearms are used in other countries as well, and
are the most popular method worldwide. Id.
184. Id. at 24, 46-48.
185. Id. at 39.
186. Id. at 39-40.
187. Id. at 59.
188. LINZEY, supra note 12, at 117-18.
189. Id. at 118-20; see also EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 53-54, 58. However, the Canadians
state that the blink test was required at one point but was discarded because it was allegedly unreliable.
The current practice is to palpate the cranium. See Marine Mammals Regulations S.O.R./1993-56 sec.
28(2) (Can.), available at http://laws-loisjustice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-93-56.pdf ("Every person who strikes
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Firearms have also raised similar animal welfare concerns; indeed, they
are considered even less humane than clubs or hakapiks because it is less likely
that the seal will die immediately. A seal not shot in the head or neck can
escape while wounded, suffering greatly.
Underwater trapping and netting are also problematic from an animal
welfare perspective, according to the EU's findings. When seals are caught in
this fashion, it can take them up to an hour to drown underwater (because of
seals' unique capacity to retain oxygen for long dives), during which time the
seals are fully conscious and thus experience very significant pain and
suffering. Indeed, this approach is so problematic that it has been prohibited
even by the Canadian government.190
Finally, an additional practice called "hooking" has added to the concerns
about animal welfare in the seal hunt. Seals that are killed or partially
immobilized are often dragged across the ice or out of the water by hooks,
leading to further pain and suffering if the animal is not yet fully
unconscious. 191
Concerns about hunting methods, and a desire for conservation, have long
led countries to place bans on hunting seals and to limit imports of seal
products. The United States has been at the forefront of seal conservation
efforts. Concerns about overhunting and depleted populations were raised as
early as the 1880s, when the United States began restricting seal hunts. The
1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention between the United States, Russia,
Japan, and the United Kingdom banned all pelagic sealing north of the thirtieth
parallel in the Pacific hemisphere;1 9 2 the treaty was followed by a five-year
American moratorium on seal hunting in order to allow the seal populations to
recover. The 1966 Fur Seal Act made it illegal for Americans to hunt or import
fur seals.193 Finally, in 1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act prohibited the
hunting or importation of any type of seals by Americans into the United
States.'94
Many other countries have also banned seal hunting and the importation
of seal products for both conservation and animal welfare reasons. South Africa
ended the commercial hunt of fur seals in 1990.195 Russia, perhaps the largest
market for Canadian seal products, recently followed the European Union's
a seal with a club or hakapik shall strike the seal on the top of the cranium until it has been crushed and
shall immediately palpate the cranium to confirm that it has been crushed.").
190. EFSA Report, supra note 10, at 26 (describing the relevant Marine Mammal Regulation).
191. Id. at 58-59.
192. Pelagic sealing is sealing on the open sea. The Convention followed a lengthy arbitration
dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom on the matter. For a complete history of the
Convention, see Thomas A. Bailey, The North Pacific Sealing Convention of1911, 4 PAC. HIST. REV. I
(1935). Also note that Article IV of the Treaty contains an aboriginal exception. Convention Between
the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 7,
1911, 37 Stat. 1543 (The Fur Seal Treaty of 1911).
193. Fur Seal Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-702, 80 Stat. 1091 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-
1187).
194. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 31 (2006).




lead and banned the importation of many seal products.'9 6 Belarus and
Kazakhstan, which are in a customs union with Russia, have also recently
imposed bans.' 97 Mexico and Croatia have banned the import of seal products
since 2006. None of these previous actions has ever been challenged by Canada
or Norway in an international proceeding, despite the fact that the U.S. ban has
existed for almost forty years.
The above analysis shows that animal welfare is a longstanding,
independent, bona fide rationale for legislation. Historically and currently, in
Europe and elsewhere, domestic legal regimes have expressed a real concern
for animal welfare. This, along with the legislative history of the measure,
demonstrates that the EU ban on seal products is based on a genuine,
nonpretextual desire to protect animals from cruelty.
More generally, there has been an increasing recognition of animal
welfare as a global value. As Myun Park and Peter Singer have recently argued:
A new movement is emerging. With an increasing number of animals being
raised for international markets, and with a growing ability for people to watch
previously unseen footage of animal handling, policymakers, businesspeople,
nongovernmental organizations, and ordinary citizens are showing greater
interest in how animals are treated, wherever they may be. It is no longer
sufficient for governments to be concerned for the welfare of animals within
their own borders; animal welfare is quickly becoming an issue of international
concern.198
As noted by Park and Singer, at its second Global Conference on Animal
Welfare, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OLE) adopted
recommendations that included a clear recognition that animal welfare
measures should be based not only on science but also on ethics: "animal
welfare standards should be democratically and transparently adopted and both
science and ethics based, bearing in mind the production systems and uses of
animals of each Member and the relevant environmental, regional, geographic,
economic, cultural and religious aspects." 99 OlE is developing international
animal welfare standards in a number of areas (although it has not yet
addressed seal hunting). By referring to measures based both on science and on
ethics, the OlE Recommendations indicate international endorsement of the
196. For reports in the press, see, for example, Gloria Galloway, Russian Ban 'Spells the End of
Canadian Sealing,' Activists Say, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 19, 2011, http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/russian-ban-spells-the-end-of-canadian-
sealing-activists-say/article2276572, and Province Wants Ottawa To Act on Proposed Russian Seal Ban,
CANADIAN PRESS (Toronto), Dec. 24, 2011, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-and-
labrador/story/2011/ 12/24/nl-cp-russians-seal-ban-1224.html. News of the Russian decision broke when
Russia reported its decision to the WTO. Trade and Trade-Related Measures, Mid October 2010 - Mid
October 2011, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
newsl le/tablel/annual?overviewl lxls. The ban was implemented by Decision 696 of the Customs
Union Commission. It appears that the Russian ban, in conjunction with the European ban, has begun to
affect the demand for Canadian seal products. See Russia Bans Trade in Harp Seal Fur, MRCVS.CO.UK
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.mrcvs.co.uk/en/news-story.php?id=6808.
197. Ban on Seal Products Extends Further, ICE NEWS (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.icenews.is/
index.php/2012/01/02/ban-on-seal-products-extends-further.
198. Miyun Park & Peter Singer, The Globalization of Animal Welfare: More Food Does Not
Require More Suffering, FOREIGN AFF. Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 122-33.
199. WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, supra note 7.
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appropriateness of animal welfare measures that have both instrumental and
noninstrumental ethical components, the latter based at least partly on
considerations other than those that can be established through science. The
recommendations also acknowledge that, inter alia, religious and cultural
considerations may play a part in the way in which animal welfare standards
are formulated.
IV. LEGAL CLAIMS AND RESPONSES
Canada and Norway have made a variety of legal claims contesting the
European ban. They range from violations of the traditional General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to violations of the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement (TBT) and the Agreement on Agriculture.200 The European Union,
in turn, has argued that these claims do not have merit, and that in any case the
EU ban can be justified by an affirmative defense: the General Exceptions
clause in Article XX of the GATT.20 1 This Part will evaluate the strength of
these legal claims and the affirmative defenses offered by the European Union.
We argue that Canada and Norway's arguments are without merit-the
European Union should prevail with respect to each of the claims that Canada
and Norway assert-and, most importantly, that Article XX provides a robust
affirmative defense for the EU ban. 202 Before proceeding to analyze the legal
claims at issue, however, we offer a brief introduction to WTO law and
procedure.
A. Overview of WTO Law and Procedure
The WTO is an intergovernmental organization that deals with trade in
goods, services, and intellectual property among nations. 203 The WTO is not the
first multilateral trade regime, however; it evolved out of an earlier treaty called
the GATT, which remains the most important agreement for regulating trade in
goods within the WTO umbrella.204 The GATT was signed by twenty-three
countries in 1948 and regulated only trade in goods.205 It was a treaty through
which countries committed to binding tariffs on imports, equal treatment of all
200. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
201. This Clause permits states to justify otherwise impermissible restrictions on trade for a
number of reasons, including health, environmental protection, and "public morals." See infra note 233.
202. In Part V, we will further defend this legal analysis through our vision of the WTO as a
nonconstitutional order which should permit ethical pluralism among its member states. We argue that
ethical choices should be left up to the individual members of the trade regime.
203. What is the WTO?, supra note 16 (explaining that the WTO defines trade as the exchange
of goods, services, and intellectual property).
204. For histories of the GATT's origins and subsequent development, see KENNETH DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1993); RICHARD N. GARDNER,
STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1969); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
THE GATT (1969); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (2005).
205. See generally BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 13, 17 (1995) (describing the
complex history of the GATT's development).
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trading partners in terms of tariff barriers, and non-discriminatory treatment of
imported products and domestic products.206 The purpose of these provisions
was to facilitate trade among nations and to prevent nations from using trade as
a political weapon.207 Through a series of negotiations called "trade rounds",
the GATT gradually expanded its membership as well as the goods regulated
by the regime.20s
The most important of these negotiations was known as the Uruguay
Round.209 Negotiations began in 1986, and were not concluded until 1994,
when member nations signed the Uruguay Round Final Act.210 The Round
resulted in the most significant expansion of the GATT mandate and the
creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.211 New multilateral
agreements were established, governing trade in services, intellectual property,
technical regulations, and sanitary measures.212 All of these agreements were
adopted on a consensus basis, and all parties had to adhere to all of the
multilateral agreements in order to retain their membership in the WTO.213
Thus, the package of multilateral agreements is often called the Single
214Undertaking. More countries were brought into the GATT system during the
Uruguay Round; by the end of the negotiations, 123 countries were part of the
formal international trading regime.215 Further, a permanent institution was
created to regulate international trade, as distinct from the ad hoc treaty regime
of the GATT: the WTO. The WTO's basic institutional framework was set out
in a treaty called the WTO Agreement, also part of the Uruguay Round Final
Act. The WTO include a strong system to resolve disputes between member
states.216
WTO law, then, is a complex series of treaties and agreements that
evolved over a half-century of trade rounds. The original GATT is now but one
part of the WTO legal regime. The multilateral agreements negotiated during
the Uruguay Round, plus the GATT, are termed the "covered agreements."217
206. Id. at 12-13.
207. Id.; Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact2_e.htm.
208. For a description of the various trade rounds, see The GATT Years: From Havana to
Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/
fact4_e.htm; and The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis e/ tif e/fact5_e.htm.
209. This Round of negotiations is known as the Uruguay Round because it began in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, in 1986. The Uruguay Round, supra note 208.
2 10. Id.
211. See What is the WTO?, supra note 16; see also HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 205, at
37-40 (describing the move from GATT to WTO).
212. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25 (2005).
213. Whose WTO Is It Anyway?, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto.e/whatis e/tif e/org Ie.htm.
214. How the Negotiations Are Organized, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratopelddae/work-organi-e.htm.
215. Perhaps the best history of the Uruguay Round can be found in HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI,
supra note 205, at 19-20.
216. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 2-3 (1999); The Uruguay Round, supra note 208.
217. There are also plurilateral codes that bind only the subset of WTO members that have
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These are the main sources of WTO law. 2 18 When analyzing whether a country
has met its WTO commitments, one must examine whether it has complied
with its obligations under all of the covered agreements. Further, many of the
WTO treaties contain exceptions and limitations clauses, so even if a measure
is a prima facie violation of an obligation, the defending member may seek to
justify this violation under one of those clauses. In the Seal Products case,
Canada and Norway have challenged the EU's actions under various covered
agreements. Therefore, the legal analysis below considers all of the covered
agreements referenced in the case.
The original GATT regime included an informal dispute settlement
process. If one country felt that another was violating its GATT obligations in
some fashion, it could request that the GATT Council establish a panel to
adjudicate the dispute.219 However, there was no means of appeal, and the
decision was not legally binding unless adopted by a consensus of the GATT
parties. Thus, the losing party could in effect "veto" a panel ruling. Under the
WTO, this dispute settlement system changed significantly into a system of
compulsory third-party, two-instance adjudication.220 First, countries take their
disputes to ad hoc panels of neutral decisionmakers established by the WTO.
Either party can appeal the panel ruling to the permanent Appellate Body (AB),
which has the power to reverse, affirm, or modify panel reports.221 Panels and
the AB can instruct a member state to bring its measures into compliance.222 if
one party believes that another has not complied with the order, it can take the
opposing party to a compliance panel, which may determine whether the losing
party has adequately implemented the ruling. If the panel determines that the
member has not complied, further procedure can result in the imposition of
countermeasures.223 Panels and the AB issue reports, which form the "case
law" of the WTO.
This new system of dispute resolution gives significant clout to the WTO
legal regime, which commentators have called the strongest dispute settlement
system in international law.224 Canada and Norway's case against the European
signed onto them. See supra note 16.
218. For a complete description of the sources of WTO law, see Petros C. Mavroidis, No
Outsourcing ofLaw? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 421 (2008).
219. Hudec, supra note 216, at 5.
220. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 77 (2007) (describing new dispute settlement
procedures); see also Petko D. Kantchevski, The Differences Between the Panel Procedures of the
GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels in Trade Dispute Settlement, 3 INT'L L. &
MGMT. REV. 79 (2006) (summarizing the differences between the old GATT and new WTO
proceedings); Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1195 (1998) (summarizing politics and procedures of the new dispute resolution system).
221. HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 220, at 81. The Appellate Body is a "permanent
body composed of renowned experts . . . seen as a definitive departure from a diplomacy oriented
jurisprudence." Id. at 78.
222. Id at 81.
223. Id. at 81-82. A countermeasure is a measure taken against the infringing party, which
would normally violate WTO disciplines (for example, raising tariffs above MFN levels) but which is
permitted against a country found to be in breach of the Agreement.
224. Jose Alvarez has termed the perception that the WTO has the strongest legal regime in
international law "penance-envy." Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
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Union will result in a legally binding decision by the panel, which can be
appealed to the AB, and which can be enforced by way of countermeasures, as
affirmed or modified by the AB.
With the legal and procedural context of the Seal Products dispute
established, we can now proceed to examine the substance of the claims
Canada and Norway make against the European Union.
B. The EU Seal Products Ban Does Not Violate the GATT
Canada and Norway both argue that the European ban on seal products
violates three provisions of GATT 1994.225 The GATT imposes two main
requirements concerning a WTO member's obligations with respect to
domestic policies. These requirements are meant to prevent members from
circumventing agreed tariff concessions and other border restrictions on trade
through protectionist or discriminatory domestic regulation. First, there is the
"most favored nation" (MFN) obligation, 22 6 which requires states to treat all of
their trading partners alike; they cannot discriminate by giving more favorable
treatment (by way of tariffs and other barriers to trade) to some countries
without offering them to all WTO members.227
The second major obligation is national treatment.228 National treatment
requires, with respect to domestic laws, regulations, and requirements, that
WTO members treat imported products no less favorably than domestically
produced products once goods are within the country.229
The third provision that Canada and Norway claim has been violated is
the elimination of Quantitative Restrictions in GATT Article XI.230 As we
argue below, it is misleading to claim both a violation of Article III and Article
XI, since these are designed to capture different kinds of measures, and the
appropriate categorization of the EU regulation on seals would exclude the
application of Article XI to this dispute altogether.
The GATT also contains a General Exceptions clause in Article XX. 231
Under Article XX, a measure may be justified even if it violates another article
REV. 213, 226 (2002).
225. As noted above, the GATT has been the primary international agreement governing trade
in goods since 1994. See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
226. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.TS.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
227. An essential exception to MFN is GATT Article XIV(3), which permits countries to form
regional trade agreements, allowing them to treat some of their trading partners differently from others.
However, Article XIV was designed to mitigate violations of the MFN obligation and has been
interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Body to preserve the obligation to the greatest extent possible. See
Joanna Langille, Note, Neither Constitution nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by Examining the
Legal Limits on Contracting Out Through Regional Trade Agreements, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1482 (2011)
(describing how Article XIV was designed to mitigate MFN violations and how MFN has been
interpreted to be an "essential" WTO obligation which should not be varied).
228. GATT, supra note 226, art. III. There is also a somewhat differently framed National
Treatment obligation that concerns taxation or fiscal measures.
229. Id.
230. GATT, supra note 226, art. XI.
231. GATT, supra note 226, art. XX.
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of the GATT.23 The Article contains a list of public policy rationales that can
justify what would otherwise be a violation of other GATT rules. The public
policy exceptions include measures taken to protect human or animal health,
public morals, and those taken in relation to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources.233
In sum, Canada and Norway have claimed that the EU seal products ban
violates Articles I, III and XI of the GATT, and that the Article XX General
Exceptions do not justify the European Union's action.234 This section will
discuss each of the claims made by Canada and Norway, and will argue that,
under current WTO law, the EU seal products ban does not violate either the
Most Favored Nation obligation or the National Treatment obligation.235
Further, we argue that even if the European Union's action violated the MFN or
National Treatment requirements, the measure could be justified under the
GATT General Exceptions.236
1. Most Favored Nation Obligation
Canada and Norway claim that the EU seal products ban violates the
MFN obligation.237 Set out in GATT Article 1:1, the MFN obligation requires
that WTO members not discriminate among their trading partners who are also
WTO members.238 Countries are permitted to impose tariffs up to the limit
specified in their tariff bindings (based on thresholds agreed to in negotiations
with other members). 239 However, the same tariff must apply to imports of all
WTO members, unless there is a relevant exception (such as those for tariff-
free trade between members of customs unions and free trade areas or for
preferential treatment of developing country imports).240
Canada and Norway both contend that the European Union is violating
the MFN obligation with the seal products ban, but they differ in their reasons.
Canada asserts that the ban violates MFN "because Canadian seal products are
not accorded immediately and unconditionally any advantage, favour, privilege
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20;
Dispute Settlement Body, 24 February 2011, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/293 (May 2, 2011), 174.
235. See infra Subsections IV.B.1 and IVB.2.
236. See infra Subsection IV.B.3.
237. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
238. The relevant text of Article 1:1 is as follows:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports
or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation . . . any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 226, art. 1:1.
239. HOEKMAN & KoSTECIG, supra note 205, at 149.
240. Id. at 148. Hoekman and Kostecki refer specifically to "countries [who] are members of
regional integration agreements." Id
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or immunity granted to like products originating in any other country."241 This
is simply a repetition of the language of GATT Article 1:1, without a concrete
argument as to why Canadian products are treated differently from those of the
European Union's other trading partners.
Norway makes a different argument than does Canada. It claims that the
European measure violates MFN because "[t]hrough the general prohibition
and the exceptions set out therein, the EU seal regime appears to discriminate
among like products originating in different countries .... "2 4 2
As the Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) WTO panel recently
observed in interpreting the TBT, as a general matter, exceptions are to be
expected in a WTO member's legitimate policy measures and do not
necessarily point to discrimination: "In fact, it is not atypical for any kind of
regulation to have exceptions in terms of the products and entities that are
subject to it. Some of the exceptions might be justifiable for practical reasons
and facilitate implementing the measure at issue." 243 While it is not clear what
claim Norway is making, it appears that Norway's argument focuses on the
exception in the EU measure for indigenous peoples. Since only certain
countries have indigenous populations, arguably the measure does not treat all
of the European Union's trading partners equally. Some countries (such as
Canada and Norway) may benefit from the exception, while others without
indigenous populations will not.244 This amounts to effective discrimination
among trading partners in violation of the MFN obligation.
When analyzing whether a measure violates the MFN obligation, one
must ask several questions.2 45 First, does the measure facially and explicitly
discriminate based on the national origin of the products in question or is it
origin-neutral? If the former, the measure is a prima facie violation of Article
1:1 and can only be justified under the General Exceptions clause of Article
XX. Second, if there is no facial discrimination among trading partners, is there
a difference in treatment when the measure is applied to different trading
partners? In other words, is there a disparate impact created by the measure? In
some cases, a disparate impact could lead to a characterization of "de facto"
discrimination; for example, the design and structure of the scheme could
indirectly favor imports of some WTO Members over those of others, even
though national origin is not explicitly mentioned. Third, is there an intent to
241. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20.
242. Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
243. Panel Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements,
7.684, WT/DS384/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter COOL].
244. We pause to note that whether Norway will benefit from the exception is ambiguous.
While Norway does have an indigenous group within its borders-the Sami people-it appears to have
structured its legal argument on the premise that it will not benefit from the exception. For background
on the Sami, see HARALD GASKI, SAMI CULTURE IN A NEW ERA: THE NORWEGIAN SAMI EXPERIENCE
(1997); ROBERT PAINE, CAMPS OF THE TUNDRA: POLITICS THROUGH REINDEER AMONG SAAMI
PASTORALISTS (2009); and TROND THUEN, QUEST FOR EQUITY: NORWAY AND THE SAAMI CHALLENGE
(1995).
245. This method for approaching MFN questions has been articulated through a series of WTO
cases, as discussed below. This approach began to be articulated in a GATT Panel Report,
Canada/Japan-Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, L/6470 - 36S/167
(July 19, 1989) [hereinafter Japan-Lumber].
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discriminate among trading partners with respect to like products? Fourth, if
there is discrimination (intentional or otherwise), is there a legitimate interest
protected by the discriminatory policy that could justify it?
For a measure to violate MFN on its face, it must explicitly treat some
trading partners less favorably than others with respect to like products. 2 46 The
meaning of what a like product is for purposes of the MFN obligation is not
straightforward. In the Colombia-Ports case, the WTO adjudicator appeared
to view the entire universe of products affected by the regulatory scheme in
question as "like." 247 If such an approach were taken here, the issue would be
whether, with respect to seal products as defined by the ambit of the EU
regulation, there is less favorable treatment of some products due to their
national origin. This approach to likeness seems apposite, since Norway, at
least, is challenging an exception to the scheme as an MFN violation, not the
ban as such.
The EU measure makes no explicit distinctions between the countries
with which the European Union trades.248 Indeed, it does not mention any
trading partners by name or differentiate between them in any other way. It is
therefore origin-neutral. Thus, the measure is not facially discriminatory and in
violation of MFN. Canada's bald assertion that the European measure
discriminates among its trading partners is not supported by the substance of
the European measure.
An origin-neutral measure can still violate MFN if it has the kind of
disparate impact that constitutes de facto discrimination.2 4 9 In the Canada-
Autos case, the panel clarified that the MFN obligation allows WTO members
to make distinctions between products, even if they are like, provided that those
distinctions are not structured in such a way as to lead to differential treatment
due to the national origin of the products.250 This will occur when the
distinctions in the scheme are, in effect, proxies for explicit national origin-
based criteria. In Canada-Autos, there was a closed list of automobile
manufacturers who qualified for certain benefits.2 51 In theory, these
manufacturers could produce autos anywhere in the world, but in practice each
246. Id
247. Panel Report, Colombia-Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, T 7.355
WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Colombia-Ports] ("In the Panel's view, it is not necessary to
determine through lengthy analysis whether textiles, apparel or footwear arriving from other countries
are in fact like products to those goods originating in and arriving from Panama. Based on the design of
the ports of entry measure, any textiles, apparel or footwear imported from territories other than
Panama or the CFZ, are like products, and would necessarily be allowed entry at 11 ports of entry in
Colombia without presenting an advance import declaration, as long as the product did not circulate
through Panama or the CFZ prior to arrival in Colombia.") (emphasis added).
248. See EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
249. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DSl39/AB/R, WT/DSl42/AB/R (June 19, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Autos]
("Nevertheless, we observe that Article 1:1 does not cover only 'in law', or de jure, discrimination. As
several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article 1:1 covers also 'in fact', or de facto, discrimination"
(footnote omitted citing inter alia Spanish Coffee)); Panel Report, Spain-Tariff Treatment Of Unroasted
Coffee, L/5135 - 28S/102 (June I1, 1981) [hereinafter Spanish Coffee].
250. Canada-Autos, supra note 249.
251. Id 1 80.
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of the manufacturers concentrated its production in one or several specific
WTO member countries. Thus, the distinction in question was structurally
designed to favor products from those WTO member countries in which the
listed manufacturers had existing production facilities.
In the Seal Products case, Norway argues that the exception for
252indigenous products has a disparate impact. The European Union permits the
importation of products from countries with indigenous populations that hunt
seals and bans products entirely from countries without indigenous
populations.253 Arguably, the exception operates to provide more favorable
treatment, not less, to countries like Norway with indigenous peoples engaged
in sealing than to those countries without indigenous sealing activity.
More profoundly, the concept of discrimination in the WTO is not based
on the notion of identical treatment. The Appellate Body of the WTO made this
clear in the Shrimp/Turtle case254 in which it interpreted the nondiscrimination
provisions that applied where WTO members were seeking to invoke GATT's
Article XX General Exceptions clause in order to justify their measures. The
AB held that the obligation not to discriminate between countries where the
same conditions prevail also implied the obligation to treat differently countries
where different conditions prevail.255 Interpreting the meaning of "treatment no
less favorable" in the context of the National Treatment obligation, an
important GATT panel indicated that in some circumstances identical treatment
can be less favorable. 256 In the EC-Generalized System of Preferences case,
the AB also held that treating different countries differently could in some
circumstances serve rather than undermine the relevant purposes of WTO
law.257 The AB held in Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports:
When viewed in the abstract, the concept of discrimination may encompass
both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well as treating
dissimilar situations in a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has
previously dealt with the concept of discrimination and the meaning of the term
"non-discriminatory", and acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of
distinctions between similar situations is concerned, the ordinary meaning of
discrimination can accommodate both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing
distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a
provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of
differential treatment is prohibited. In all cases, a claimant alleging
discrimination will need to establish that differential treatment has occurred in
order to succeed in its claim.258
Indeed, the accommodation of WTO members who have indigenous
communities and international legal obligations towards those communities
252. See Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
253. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
254. US-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 3.
255. Id. 1177.
256. Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 1 5.11, L/6439 -
36S/345 (Nov. 7, 1989).
257. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter EC-GSP].
258. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatments
ofImported Grain, 187, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 31, 2005).
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may constitute a fulfillment rather than a breach of the relevant concept of
nondiscrimination in the WTO. Here, one would need to interpret the relevant
non-WTO international law and construct an interpretation of WTO law that
heeds both legal regimes.
Further, we have been assuming that, like the closed list of manufacturers
in the Canada-Autos case,259 the indigenous communities exception
inherently operates so as to exclude some WTO members' exports that
otherwise meet the criteria of subsistence sealing, favoring those of Canada,
with its Inuit community, and Norway, with its Sami population. 26 0 But the EU
measure actually provides an exception for hunts "conducted by Inuit and other
indigenous communities [which] contribute to their subsistence."261 The word
'indigenous' is not defined by the EU measure, 262 and has eluded definition at
263the international level. If the word is interpreted to include any indigenous
group hunting seals for subsistence purposes, then in principle products that are
produced in the required manner would be equally eligible for the exception
regardless of where they came from. Norway then would not be able to make
out a case for an "as such" violation of WTO law on the face of the regulation;
whether the measure actually violated WTO law would be determined on the
264basis of how the European Union applies the scheme.
Finally, we have suggested that, at first glance, an approach to the
meaning of "like products" in this case could be appropriately based on the
analytic at work in the Colombia-Ports panel ruling.265 One might view the
indigenous exception not as an exception to a general regulatory scheme that
applies in seal products, but rather as a principle governing the general
application of the law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples to the
specific situation of seal hunting. In the Seal Products dispute, a panel could
find that the seal products produced by aboriginals and those not produced by
aboriginals are not like products. The consumer needs met by the two products
may be very different.266 The exception for aboriginal products in the EU
measure applies only to seal products made for subsistence purposes. 267 It is
likely, therefore, that only small-scale production methods will be eligible for
259. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
260. As noted supra at note 244, it is unclear whether Norway feels that the Sami will be able
to benefit from the indigenous exception. But there is nothing on the face of the EU measure to suggest
such non-applicability.
261. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art. 3.1 (emphasis added).
262. Id.
263. For a discussion of the elusive nature of the term "indigenous peoples," see, for example,
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the
Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
264. For a discussion of the difference between "as such" violations and violations through the
exercise of discretion, see Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, $T 165-66, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29,
2004); and Robert Howse & Robert W. Staiger, United States-Sunset Review ofAnti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, AB-2003-5, WT/DS244/AB/R: A Legal
and Economic Analysis ofthe Appellate Body Ruling, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 471 (2006).
265. Colombia-Ports, supra note 247.
266. See generally Spanish Coffee, supra note 249 (including consumer needs in the definition
of likeness).
267. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8, art 3.1.
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the exception to the EU measure. Thus the seal products made by indigenous
communities for subsistence purposes could well serve different consumer
needs than those produced through larger operations and by nonindigenous
peoples for commercial purposes. Therefore, under the criteria for likeness, as
established by Spanish Coffee,268 there is a good argument that indigenous
products are not 'like' products produced by nonindigenous peoples.
The distinction, tenable under the Spanish Coffee criteria, between
indigenous-produced goods and nonindigenous goods is also made in other
269contexts. The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 2007, enshrines the rights of
270aboriginals to maintain their culture and pursue their traditional livelihood.
This suggests that goods produced by aboriginals through traditional methods
are not viewed as 'like' other goods, because they are fundamentally connected
to the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their culture and pursue a
traditional livelihood. One hundred forty-four countries voted in favor of
adopting the Declaration, 271 suggesting that most countries in the world
consider aboriginal products distinct from non-aboriginal products. Since
abiding by the Declaration and other international law instruments protecting
the rights of aboriginal peoples was the explicit motivation for the EU
exception for aboriginal-produced seal products,272 aboriginal products are
rightly viewed as not "like" other products. It will thus be difficult for Norway
to substantiate its claim that the EU violates the MFN obligation.
The absence of intent by the European Union to discriminate against
particular WTO members in favor of others may also be relevant, and point
against a finding of an MFN violation. The GATT-era Japan-Lumber case
holds that the party claiming discrimination has the burden of proving that there
was an intent to discriminate.273 This is generally shown by demonstrating that
there was a diversion from 'normal,' objective categories to single out a
particular imported product for special treatment.274 While more recent case
law does not insist on an intent requirement, recent panel rulings such as
Canada-Autos and Colombia-Ports have stressed that the purpose of the
MFN obligation is to prohibit discrimination based on country of origin.
The European Union did not adopt the indigenous exception so that it
could discriminate among its trading partners; it argues that it implemented this
measure simply to comply with its international law obligations. This is well
established in the legislative history, as discussed above.275 There is no
268. Spanish Coffee, supra note 249.
269. Id.
270. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
271. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM
ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsof
Indigenous Peoples.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
272. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
273. Japan-Lumber, supra note 245.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
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indication that the European Union intended to privilege certain trading
partners over others. The fact that some countries happen to have indigenous
populations and others do not may create an incidental disparate impact, but the
EU scheme is not structured or designed to benefit those countries. Further, this
classification into aboriginal and non-aboriginal products is (as discussed above
and below) appropriate and sanctioned by international legal mechanisms.
Further, the EU measure, in addition to not being intentionally
discriminatory under Japan-Lumber,277 is justified by a legitimate interest.
According to Japan-Lumber, the party defending has the burden of proving
that there is a rational basis for a legitimate interest, and legitimate interests are
defined extremely broadly.2 78 In essence, the defending country must show a
rational basis rooted in domestic policy.
In this case, it will be easy for the European Union to show a legitimate
interest at stake in the exception for aboriginal products. The exception is
arguably required by various international law instruments that recognize the
right of aboriginal peoples to pursue traditional livelihoods and maintain their
cultural practices. Therefore, the claim that there is an MFN violation will fail
at this prong of the test as well. Indeed, in light of established WTO case law,
the Canadian and Norwegian arguments seem farfetched. They are unlikely to
succeed by claiming an MFN violation.
One final comment on the indigenous exception more generally is in
order. Some scholars have argued that if the EU ban on seal products has the
effect of harming the livelihood and traditional way of life of aboriginals, then
the ban can be understood to violate the rights of indigenous peoples. 27 9 The
determination of whether the aboriginal exception in the EU ban adequately
fulfills the European Union's obligations to protect the rights of indigenous
peoples is outside the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement organs, which
cannot address claims that non-WTO international agreements have been
violated (unless those agreements are incorporated into or referenced in WTO
law itself). 2 80 There is of course the question of whether the aboriginal
exception in the EU ban is sufficiently sensitive to the different conditions of
countries with particular aboriginal populations. This question is largely one of
the effects that specific instances of the application of the aboriginal exception
have on aboriginal communities where applications for aboriginal imports have
been refused. Canada's and Norway's WTO challenge is, by contrast, a claim
that the EU scheme "as such" violates WTO law. Canada and Norway have
challenged the EU scheme as a whole and have not identified any individual
instances in which the European Union has refused to allow in aboriginal
imports in violation of WTO law. We would further observe, as mentioned
276. EU Seal Products ban, supra note 8.
277. See Japan-Lumber, supra note 245, at 27.
278. Id. at 31-32.
279. Kamrul Hossain, The EU ban on the Import of Seal Products and the WTO Regulations:
Neglected Human Rights of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples?, POLAR RECORD (forthcoming 2012).
280. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, T 56,




above, that the EU implementation of the aboriginal exception is the subject of
active litigation in the European Union; it would be inappropriate for the WTO
panel to operate on the hypothesis that the outcome of this litigation would be
an interpretation of the aboriginal exception that results in a violation of WTO
law.281
2. National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions
Canada and Norway have also argued that the EU measure violates the
National Treatment obligation and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in
Article XI. GATT Article III, the National Treatment obligation, requires WTO
member states to treat imported products the same way they treat products
produced domestically, under internal regulatory and taxation schemes.282
GATT Article XI, a related article regarding Quantitative Restrictions, requires
WTO members to refrain from banning or restricting imports of particular
283
products. Unlike Article III, Article XI is aimed at border measures rather
than internal regulations. 2 84 Canada and Norway claim both an Article III and
an Article XI violation.2 8 5 As will be discussed later, these are best understood
as arguments in the alternative. The architecture of the GATT would make little
sense if internal laws, regulations and requirements could also be viewed as
restrictions and prohibitions on imports or exports. If that were so, then internal
laws, regulations, and requirements would be prima facie violations of the
GATT, even if they were nondiscriminatory. The permissiveness of
nondiscriminatory internal laws, regulations and requirements as provided by
the National Treatment obligation-an essential feature of the balance between
trade liberalization and domestic policy space-would be undermined, because
once a measure falls under Article XI, and provided it does not qualify under
any of Article XI's specific exceptions, the measure is prima facie a violation
of the GATT, whether discriminatory or not.
a. Article III v. Article Xl
The test that has been adopted by the WTO dispute settlement organs to
determine whether a measure is a ban (Article XI) or a regulation (Article 111:4)
28 1. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, § V, $ 13 (Oct.
22, 2001) (adopted Nov. 26, 2001) ("There is no way of knowing or predicting when or how that
particular legal proceeding will conclude in the United States. The Turtle Island case has been appealed
and could conceivably go as far as the Supreme Court of the United States.... It would have been an
exercise in speculation on the part of the Panel to predict either when or how that case may be concluded
... The Panel was correct not to indulge in such speculation, which would have been contrary to the duty
of the Panel, under Article 11 of the DSU, to make 'an objective assessment of the matter ... including
an objective assessment of the facts of the case').
282. GATT, supra note 226, art. III.
283. GATT, supra note 226, art. XI.
284. Article XI is not part of the National Treatment obligation. Instead, it is termed
"Quantitative Restrictions." However, it is related to the National Treatment obligation for reasons
discussed below.
285. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
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looks to what is called "Ad Note III" of Article III of the GATT.2 86 Ad Notes
are legally binding interpretive notes inserted by the drafters of the GATT. The
note accompanying Article III suggests that the way to distinguish between
Article XI and Article III is to look at whether the measure affects the
'importation' of products (Article XI), or whether it affects 'imported products'
(Article III).287 In other words, Article XI does not refer to internal
requirements, but measures imposed at the border, while Article III applies to
internal requirements and regulations.288 As interpreted by the panel in
Canada-Alcoholic Beverages, this means that if a measure applies both to
domestic products and to imported products, it should fall under the Article III
rubric, even if its application to imports occurs at the border.289 If it applies
exclusively to imported products, and is solely a border measure, then Article
XI is the relevant clause. 290 The panel offered a similar analysis in EC-
Asbestos, in which the panel applied Ad Note III in finding that France's ban
on asbestos and asbestos products was to be assessed under Article 111:4 and
not Article XI, because it applied to both domestic and imported products. In
EC-Asbestos the panel also rightly noted that for Article III to govern, the
measure applied to imported products need not be identical to that aspect
applied to domestic products. 291 These findings of the panel in EC-Asbestos
were not challenged on appeal.
In this case, the EU measure applies both to internal and imported
products. It reaches equally products made within the European Union and
those made outside of the European Union. It should therefore be considered an
Article III internal regulation rather than an Article XI quantitative restriction,
286. Interpretative Note to GATT Article III ("Ad Art. III") provides that:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in paragraph I which applies to an imported product and to the like
domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the
time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1,
and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article Ill.
GATT, supra note 226, art. III. Annex I, Ad Art. III (Interpretative Note).
287. See Panel Report, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 13.13,
L/5504 - 30S/140 (Feb. 7, 1984) [hereinafter Canada-FIRA].
288. The 1984 Panel Report on Canada-FIRA notes that:
The Panel shares the view of Canada that the General Agreement distinguishes between
measures affecting the 'importation' of products, which are regulated in Article XI: 1, and
those affecting 'imported products', which are dealt with in Article Ill. If Article XI:1
were interpreted broadly to cover also internal requirements, Article Ill would be partly
superfluous. Moreover, the exceptions to Article XI:l, in particular those contained in
Article XI:2, would also apply to internal requirements restricting imports, which would
be contrary to the basic aim of Article Ill. The Panel did not find, either in the drafting
history of the General Agreement or in previous cases examined by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, any evidence justifying such an interpretation of Article XI. For these reasons,
the Panel, noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent the importation of goods as
such, reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with Article XI: 1.
Id.
289. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Canada-Tax Exemptions and Reductions for
Wine and Beer, WT/DS354/2 (Dec. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Canada-Alcoholic Beverages].
290. Id.
291. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, 8/92-8.99. 893, WT/DS135//R, (Mar. 12, 2011) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos
(Panel)].
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under the Ad Note III analysis. However, given that Canada and Norway have
argued that the EU measure violates Article III and Article XI, we consider
both claims below.
b. GATT Article 111:4
As argued above, since the EU measure is an internal law, regulation, or
requirement applied to both domestic and imported products, it should be
evaluated under GATT Article III;4. Article III requires WTO member states to
provide even-handed treatment to imported products and like domestic
products.29 Article III distinguishes between taxation and regulation: Article
111:2 deals with taxation 2 93 and 111:4 with regulation.2 94 The EU measure does
not impose a tax but rather seeks to regulate the importation of seal products;295
it therefore must be analyzed under Article 111:4. Canada and Norway have
both claimed that the seals measure violates 111:4.296 Canada states that 111:4 is
violated because "the measures result in less favourable treatment of seal
products from Canada than like products originating in the European Union." 297
Norway submitted that "[t]hrough the general prohibition and the exceptions
set out therein, the EU seal regime appears to discriminate between imported
products and like products originating in the European Union, in violation of
Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994."298
The approach of the WTO Appellate Body to Article 111:4 has generally
involved a two-step process. The first step considers what is the appropriate
universe of "like" products applicable to the dispute, and the second step
determines whether the group of imported like products is treated less
favorably than the group of domestic like products. 299 The "right to regulate"
principle in the WTO system is discussed by the Appellate Body in recent case
292. GATT, supra note 226, art. Ill.
293. The full text of Article 111:2 is as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
GATT, supra note 226, art. 111:2.
294. The full text of Article 111:4 is as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GATT, supra note 226, art. 111:4.
295. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
296. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
297. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20, at 2.
298. Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20, at 2.
299. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, IN 84-141, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos
(Appellate)].
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law. 300 The idea, already expressed in the introduction to this Article,30' is that
the WTO is not a constitutional regime, a super-regulator, or a global
governmental authority at the bar of which states must justify themselves
before regulating. 302 On the contrary, regulations are presumed to be legitimate
unless they have specific features that engage the precise treaty obligations of
the WTO system. Merely because, actually or hypothetically, a measure has
some effect on trade does not make it suspect or subject to scrutiny. The seal
products regulation is neutral on its face as between domestic and imported
products,303 and it has no features that raise suspicions that it has any aim other
than to further legitimate animal welfare goals, and certainly no features to
favor domestic products over imported ones. The exceptions provisions, if
anything, advantage imported over domestic products as they provide some
exceptions for personal property imported into the European Union, and the
"indigenous" exception may actually operate to give more favorable treatment
to some products from outside the European Union, depending on how
"indigenous" is interpreted. In any case, there is nothing in the design and
structure of the EU scheme that suggests that it would operate with the kind of
discriminatory effect or intent that it is the purpose of Article III to discipline.
Based on the two-step approach endorsed by the Appellate Body304 the
panel will first assess whether domestic and imported products are "like." The
likeness test used in the National Treatment-regulation context has been
interpreted to include both like products and those that are directly competitive
and substitutable. 3 05 Determining whether products are "like" involves
comparing physical characteristics, consumer tastes and preferences, end uses,
and customs classifications. 30 6 The likeness test also includes factors such as
health-if a product has a different effect on health than another product, and
this affects consumer's perceptions of the two products, they may not be
considered "like." 307 In the recent US-Clove Cigarettes report, the Appellate
Body affirmed its earlier ruling in EC-Asbestos: "regulatory concerns and
considerations may play a role in applying certain of the 'likeness' criteria (that
is, physical characteristics and consumer preferences) and, thus, in the
determination of likeness under Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994."30s
In the EC-Seal Products case, domestically produced seal products seem
to be "like" imported seal products. Seal products are harvested and processed
in Europe, as they are in the rest of the world; seals are caught in Finland and
Sweden and processed in Scotland, Denmark, and Italy, just as they are in
300. China-Publications and Audiovisual, supra note 28, 1136-138, 206-207, 218-233; US-
Clove Cigarettes, % 95-96.
301. See supra Introduction.
302. See infra Part IV.
303. EU Seal Products Ban, supra note 8.
304. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
305. EC-Asbestos (Appellate), supra note 299.
306. See id.
307. Id. 1151.
308. US-Clove Cigarettes, 1 117.
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Canada, Norway, etc. 309 There is no discernible difference in terms of end use
between European products and those hunted and produced elsewhere. They
appear to be in competition, to meet similar needs, and so on. As noted, the EU
ban applies identically to EU and non-EU seal products, as does the aboriginal
exception, which may actually result in more favorable treatment of imports
from countries with aboriginal communities outside the European Union.
Thus, in order for Canada or Norway to make a prima facie case of a
violation of National Treatment, they would have to identify some group of
internally produced non-seal products that are permitted in the European Union
and that are "like" seal products. This would be very difficult to do, and Canada
and Norway have not suggested that their complaint centers on the view that
the EU scheme favors domestic EU products that are substitutes for banned seal
products. First of all, non-seal products have, by definition, different physical
characteristics than seal products. As the AB held in EC-Asbestos, it would
generally be difficult to find that products are "like" where there are significant
differences in physical characteristics. These physical differences, namely the
species used in the making of the product, are highly salient from the
perspective of consumer preferences, given that it is precisely the physical
characteristic of being made from seals that has led to widespread public
concern about these products, given moral beliefs about the cruel treatment of
seals in their making. Secondly, considering consumer preferences as a
criterion independent of physical characteristics, to the extent that the non-seal
products do not carry with them the same animal welfare concerns as seal
products, and for other reasons too, perceptions of the vast majority of
European Consumers of seal products are different, pointing to a finding of
"unlikeness." As we have noted above, the EU regulation reflects widespread
public outrage at the treatment of seals in particular. 310
If Canada or Norway were to establish that there is a category of "like"
domestic EU non-seal products to which the treatment of imported seal
products should therefore be compared, then Canada or Norway would need to
establish that the treatment of the entire group of like imported products (seal
and non-seal) is less favorable than the entire group of like domestic products
(seal and non-seal). But there are simply no elements of the scheme that
indicate a de jure or a de facto bias in favor of domestic products.
Hypothetically, this could be the case if, for example, the prohibited seal
products were almost exclusively imported while the permitted like products
were almost entirely of internal EU origin. 3 But there are several EU
countries which profit from sealing-Denmark, Italy, Finland, and Scotland,
among others-and which will be harmed by the ban. Thus, within the group of
"like" domestic products there are some products the competitive opportunities
309. EFSA Report, supra note 10.
310. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
311. See Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment-or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921 (2002); Nicolas F. Diebold,
Non-discrimination and the Pillars of International Economic Law (HILJ Emerging Scholars Paper 18,
2010) (describing how the nondiscrimination principle is the "cornerstone" of the international trading
regime).
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for which are also negatively affected by the ban. This points strongly in favor
of a conclusion of even-handedness.
Even if it were the case that the EU ban were de facto detrimental to the
competitive opportunities for imported products relative to like domestic
products, there should still be no violation of National Treatment if the
detrimental effects are exclusively attributable to a legitimate regulatory
distinction. 312 While the Appellate Body has held that the concept of National
Treatment in WTO law encompasses disciplines on both de jure and de facto
discrimination, 3 13 it has also excluded from the meaning of de facto
discrimination a situation where the "detrimental impact on imports . . . stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction." 314As we have shown in
the earlier parts of this Article, the regulatory distinctions in the EU seals
measure are based on legitimate nondiscriminatory policy objectives. This
includes the exceptions in the EU scheme. Given that a measure may have
multiple objectives, 315 it may contain regulatory distinctions that serve these
different purposes. Provided that all of the objectives are legitimate, i.e. non-
protectionist, any differential treatment that results from the application of
those distinctions will not be deemed less favorable within the meaning of
Article III:4; thus, there will be no violation of National Treatment.316
c. GATTArticle X7
If the panel concludes that GATT Article XI applies instead of Article III
(a conclusion which would be incorrect under the current case law, as discussed
above),317 there will almost certainly be a violation of Article XI found. The
Article holds that any quantitative restriction or any measure having the effect
of such a restriction is impermissible. 31 Therefore, if the EU measure counts as
312. US-Clove Cigarettes, 1 182. Although the approach here described was developed by the
Appellate Body in interpreting the National Treatment provision of the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement, not Article 111:4 of the GATT, in the same decision the Appellate Body held that the same
conception of the right to regulate applies to the interpretation of both Agreements, and particularly that
"[t]he balance set out in the preamble of the TBT Agreement between, on the one hand, the desire to
avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and, on the other hand, the recognition of
Members' right to regulate, is not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the GATT 1994,
where obligations such as national treatment in Article III are qualified by the general exceptions
provision of Article XX." Id. 1 96.
313. See supra note 249, Canada-Autos, 16.87.
314. US-Clove Cigarettes, 1 18 1.
315. Id. 115. Thus, in US-Clove Cigarettes, the AB held that it was legitimate for the US to
consider, in determining the scope of its regulation of flavored cigarettes, both the public health
objective of preventing young people from becoming addicted to tobacco as well as the concern that
banning a product to which a large population group were already addicted would cause undue
suffering. However, based on the factual record of the panel, the AB found that balancing the two
different legitimate objectives could not justify in this case banning clove cigarettes and not menthol
ones, since the significant population of menthol smokers could continue to satisfy their addiction by
switching to permitted non-menthol tobacco cigarettes. The two US objectives were both perfectly
legitimate, even if on the facts, the Appellate Body held that the regulatory distinction the US drew
between clove and menthol cigarettes could not be justified by the need to balance those legitimate
objectives.
316. US-Clove Cigarettes, 1 215.
317. See supra Subsection III.2.A.
318. GATT, supra note 226, art. XI.
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such, then it is prohibited. Article XI does contain certain exceptions, 319 but
they do not seem likely to apply in this case.
If Article XI is found to apply, therefore, the EU measure can only be
justified under the General Exceptions clause of the GATT.320 This exceptions
clause applies to all GATT violations and is analyzed in detail below.
3. General Exceptions (Article XM)
If a claimant can establish a prima facie violation of a provision of the
GATT, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify the measure under the
General Exceptions clause of Article XX.321 Article XX has two parts.322 First,
there is the so-called "chapeau" of the Article, which requires that measures not
be "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . ."323 Second, Article
XX contains a list of policy justifications, which allows member states to
justify trade restrictive measures that would otherwise violate the GATT. These
justifications include, among others, the protection of public morals, public
health, environmental protection, and natural resource conservation.324
As indicated by the Appellate Body in China-Publications and
Audiovisual and in US-Clove Cigarettes, Article XX as a whole can be
understood as a reflection of the "right to regulate" under WTO law, especially
when considered in conjunction with other norms such as National
Treatment.325 The structure of Article XX shows that the Article is designed to
cope with both instrumental forms of regulation and regulation that is
expressive of intrinsic moral values. Listed as legitimate objectives under
Article XX are not only human and animal life and health, but also public
morals.326 What we call "public morals" regulation may, however, be justified
319. Id.
320. Id. art. XX.
321. Id. art. XX. The relevant portions of Article XX are as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
Id. GATT Article XX is rightly understood as a type of affirmative defense. See Panagiotis Delimatsis,
Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting the WTO Rulings on US-Gambling and China-
Publications and Audiovisual Products, 14 J. INT'L EcO. L. 257, 261 (2011). For a discussion of how the
EU envisaged defending the seal products ban under Article XX, see Proposal for a Regulation
Concerning Trade in Seal Products, supra note 50, at 11-13.
322. Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the
Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole, II J. INT'L Eco. L. 43, 47 (2007); Feddersen, supra note 1,
at 84, 91.
323. GATT, supra note 226, art. XX; see also Delimatsis, supra note 321, at 261-62.
324. GATT, supra note 226, art. XX (a)-(b), (g).
325. China-Publications and Audiovisual, supra note 28, T 415(a).
326. GATT, supra note 226, art. XX.
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as either instrumental regulation designed to counter certain social ills or as
expressive regulation designed to express or give force to intrinsic moral
intuitions or shared values.
Thus, in the US-Gambling case, in seeking to justify its ban on internet
gambling under the General Agreement on Services (GATS) 2 equivalent to
the GATT public morals exception, the United States cited a range of concrete
social harms associated with gambling, including organized crime and
underage gambling.328 The United States, in other words, used instrumental,
material reasons to justify its gambling ban. It did not argue for the ban in terms
of what was necessary to express moral opprobrium at gambling. The United
States is a constitutional regime founded on separation of church and state, and
such moral judgments are arguably anathema to the American approach to
regulation; indeed, they may raise serious issues of constitutionality. 3 One can
imagine that another WTO member with a different kind of domestic political
regime might be more inclined to justify prohibitions on gambling as
expressions of what is regarded as intrinsic right or wrong under the creed
followed by the majority of its society.
In the case of the EU regulation, as it applies to animal welfare, we are
faced with a dual-purpose measure: it is aimed instrumentally at reducing
unnecessary animal suffering, a goal that engages public morals as well as the
protection of animal life and health as such; it is also a noninstrumental
expression of moral opprobrium at animal cruelty, and consumer behavior that
is complicit with that cruelty. 330
Thus, under Article XX of the GATT, the justification for the EU ban
must be assessed in light of this dual purpose. Even if empirical issues exist
concerning the necessity of this measure for reducing the gratuitous suffering
of seals, still the law may reflect what is morally unacceptable in terms of the
complicity of EU consumers with animal cruelty, and thus the EU seal
regulation may also be a direct expression of the community's intrinsic ethical
or spiritual beliefs about what constitutes cruelty, and a statement of outrage
against such practices. Beliefs about animal welfare cannot themselves be
challenged, or indeed substantiated, by scientific policy analysis. As a direct
expression of such beliefs (indeed, perhaps the most direct expression in our
tradition of disapprobation-a ban), the measure is "necessary" for the
protection of public morals. This appreciation of the dual purpose of animal
welfare regulation, reflected in the World Organisation for Animal Health's
notion that animal welfare should be addressed by both science- and ethics-
327. The GATS was one of the new agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, extending the multilateral trade rules to cover trade in services. See supra Section III.A.
For a discussion of how the GATS provision on public morals follows that of the GATT, see Delimatsis,
supra note 321, at 276.
328. US-Gambling, supra note 28, 1 74.
329. Most obviously, an Establishment Clause issue. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also
FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1976); PAUL J. WEBER, EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1990).
330. See supra Part II for a description of the purpose of the regulation.
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based standards, will pervade our discussion of the specific legal issues arising
under the Article XX exceptions provision, and in particular, the complexity in
the application of the necessity test found in both Article XX(a) and Article
XX(b) to such dual purpose measures. Since the EU measure seeks both to
protect public morals and the health of animals, it can be justified under both
paragraphs of Article XX. As long as the EU ban can be justified under either,
it will be WTO-compliant. This subsection will lay out the legal argument
which justifies the EU seal products measure under both Article XX(a)-public
morals-and Article XX(b)-animal health. We argue that the EU measure is
well within the protection afforded by Article XX and therefore should be
upheld by a WTO panel.
a. Article XK(a): Public Morals
In the US-Gambling case, in interpreting the 'public morals' exception
in Article XIV of GATS, the panel favored a dynamic approach to the meaning
of 'public morals.' 33 1 "In the panel's view, the content of these concepts for
members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors,
including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values." 332 The panel
suggested that each WTO member has considerable discretion to determine
what practices would violate the moral code of the community. Based on the
panel's deferential reasoning as to the content of public morals, there is no
reason why the content of 'public morals' could not extend to beliefs of the
importing country concerning the wrongfulness of consuming products
produced in a manner that is perceived to constitute cruelty to animals. In this
Article, we have marshaled considerable evidence to suggest that the EU
measure reflects widespread contemporary beliefs that the practices in question
constitute cruelty, rooted in living European religious and philosophical
traditions333-beliefs that are common not to only one state but to an otherwise
diverse community of states. It is clear from the jurisprudence that the currently
prevailing or widespread societal beliefs and values are relevant; this is
consistent with the general principle of dynamic or evolutionary interpretation
of treaty terms, including the categories of public policy enumerated in the
paragraphs of Article XX, which have been repeatedly affirmed by the WTO
Appellate Body.334 We note here the overwhelming majority vote in favor of
the regulation by popular representatives of the European people in their
Parliament.33 5 Especially given the dynamic nature of the public morals
justification, the EU measure should clearly be permitted under the Article
331. US-Gambling, supra note 28. For a detailed history of the development of the public
morals doctrine (and the many changes it underwent), see Feddersen, supra note 1.
332. Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 16.461, WT/DS285/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
333. See supra Parts I and II (describing the long history of animal welfare regulation in Europe
and the purpose behind the European measure).
334. China-Publications and Audiovisual, supra note 28, 396 (affirming earlier Appellate
Body decisions such as US-Shrimp/Turtle).
335. See supra note 55.
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XX(a) exception.
One objection to this straightforward argument comes from Mark Wu.337
In discussing the WTO jurisprudence on public morals, Wu creates a
distinction absent from the jurisprudence, and contrary to the structure of
Article XX, between "inward-directed" and "outward-directed" measures.
Inward-directed measures concern interests solely within the territory of the
restricting WTO member. Outward-directed measures are those that aim to
protect interests outside as well as inside the territory of the trade-restricting
measure.33 9 In terms of Wu's categories, the EU regulation would be outward-
directed even though the moral concern is directly with the conduct of
consumers within the territory of the European Union, because the measure
also has the intent or effect of protecting animals that are located, in part,
outside the territory of the European Union. According to Wu, in US-
Gambling, the Appellate Body only endorsed inward-directed measures under
the public morals rubric, leaving uncertainty whether outward-directed
measures are covered.340
However, Wu's distinction has no basis in the text of the provision. 341 it
is widely accepted, for example, that imports of child pornography can be
banned on the basis of public morals;342 under Wu's analysis such a ban would
now become unsupportable on the grounds that, in as much as it protects
children in other countries against exploitation by pornographers, this would be
an outward-directed measure. Wu's approach is intrinsically flawed as it does
not address the basic fact, central to our analysis in this Article, that much, if
not most, moral regulation has a dual purpose Such regulation is required both
to express intrinsic moral beliefs and to protect defined interests.
Although the Appellate Body did not opine on this matter in US-
Gambling, in Shrimp/Turtle the AB explicitly mentioned Article XX(a) as
among the provisions of Article XX that would allow WTO members to
condition imports on the exporting country adopting certain policies. 3 43 These
are trade restrictions that Wu explicitly puts in the outward-directed category.
Thus, even though Wu's categories have no basis in themselves in WTO law or
jurisprudence, what he has chosen to define as outward-directed measures have
already been contemplated by the AB to be, in principle, within the ambit of
336. For a discussion of the use of dynamic interpretation in an Article XX(a) context, see
Feddersen, supra note 1. But see Peter L. Fitzgerald, "Morality" May Not Be Enough To Justify the EU
Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade, 14 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL. 85, 128
(2011) (arguing that the current form of the EU ban may pose Article XX problems).
337. Wu, supra note 4; see also Thomas, supra note 1, at 626 (addressing this counterargument
in the animal welfare context).
338. Wu, supra note 4.
339. Id. at 216.
340. Id. at 334.
341. Cf GATT, supra note 226, art. XX (containing no provision related to internally or
externally directed measures).
342. See FRANCESCO FRANCIONI, ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 11 (2001); Judith Matloff, As Porn Prohferates, S. Africa Debates Free Speech, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MON., Aug. 8, 1997, at 5.




The next issue in the Article XX analysis is whether the EU measure is
"necessary"-i.e. whether it is the "least restrictive measure" available.3" The
text of Article XX(a) states that for a measure to be justified, it must be
"necessary to protect public morals." 345 One of the most fundamental aspects of
the "right to regulate" under Article XX is a WTO member's sovereign
prerogative to determine the "level of protection" it is seeking. This is a notion
that has been repeatedly affirmed by the WTO Appellate Body. 346The
complaining member cannot challenge the decision of the regulating member to
seek a very high level of protection-and indeed a key weakness of Canada's
and Norway's case is that they appear simply not to accept the level of
protection the European Union seeks, on the basis of ethical beliefs among its
citizens about what constitutes "cruelty."
The concept of "necessity" in relation to public morals was elaborated by
the AB in the US-Gambling ruling.347 The regulating member need only make
a prima facie case of necessity, showing there is a plausible or reasonable fit
between the measure and its objectives, taking into account both the objectives
it is intended to achieve and the degree of trade restrictiveness involved in
obtaining them. Once this burden is met, the onus of proof is reversed and it is
the complaining party that must prove that there is a reasonably available, less
restrictive alternative for the regulating member; otherwise the measure will be
found to meet the necessity test.348 With respect to what is a "reasonably
available" less restrictive alternative, the AB has opined: "[a]n alternative
measure may be found not to be 'reasonably available' . . . where it is merely
theoretical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable
of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member,
such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties." 349 As the panel
held in the recently decided US-Clove Cigarettes case (applying the notion of
a least restrictive alternative in the context of the TBT), it is not enough for the
complainant merely to list possible or hypothetical less trade restrictive
alternatives; rather, the complainant must show that the alternative in question
will provide an equivalent contribution to the defending member's legitimate
objective. 350
344. For an argument that the EU measure fails the necessity test, see Fitzgerald, supra note
336.
345. GATT, supra note 226, art. XX(a). For further discussion of the meaning of necessity, see
Christopher Doyle, Gimme Shelter: The "Necessary" Element of GATT Article XX in the Context of the
China-Audiovisual Products Case, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 143 (2011).
346. EC-Asbestos (Panel), supra note 291, 1 168; Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 1 57, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil-
Tyres].
347. US-Gambling, supra note 28.
348. IdT310
349. Id. 1308.
350. United States-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 311, 17.423:
The problem is that the mere listing of two dozen alternative measures without more does
not show that such measures would make an equivalent contribution to the achievement
of the objective at the level of protection sought by the United States. We further note
that Indonesia does not specify whether it is any one of these measures, or some
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As noted, in US-Gambling the United States sought to justify the
challenged measure instrumentally under Article XX solely on the basis of its
contribution to the avoidance of certain material social ills, and not as an
expression of intrinsic moral beliefs or intuition.35' The analysis of "necessity"
in Gambling would thus be applicable to the instrumental aspect of the EC
measure, namely the actual reduction or avoidance of gratuitous suffering of
seals. Just as the AB held in Shrimp/Turtle that a ban on imports of shrimp
fished in a way that leads to deaths of turtles was related to conserving those
turtles,352 so with respect to seals, the ban unquestionably reduces to some
extent the market for seal products, and thus the number of seals killed.353
Since the European Union can easily establish a logical relationship
between the measure and the reduction of suffering of seals, Norway and
Canada would then face the burden of proving the existence of a less trade-
restrictive alternative that would achieve the same amount of reduction in
suffering. The manifest evidence of Canada's inability or unwillingness to
enforce even its own (inadequate relative to the moral beliefs expressed in the
European ban) domestic standards for humane killing will make it very difficult
for Canada to show that a less restrictive alternative is reasonably available that
will be effective in the real world.354
Some commentators have suggested, however, that a less deferential
approach to the necessity test under Article XX(a) is visible in the later WTO
ruling in China-Publications and Audiovisual.355 In that case, China sought to
justify restrictions on modalities by which publications could be imported and
distributed in China on the theory that the importer/distributor performed the
role of vetting the materials for conformity with China's censorship laws. 356
China argued that these laws were aimed at the protection of public morals. The
AB appeared to be subjecting the Chinese measure to greater scrutiny than it
did the US measure in US-Gambling, finding that China had not shown that a
proposed less restrictive measure was unavailable. (That measure was the direct
enforcement of censorship by Chinese government authorities.)
We submit that the AB's approach was justified because the actual
combination of these measures, or all of these measures, that would be the alternative
measure(s).
This finding of the panel was not appealed. It is true that under the TBT, the general burden of proof is
on the complainant, while under Article XX of the GATT, the general burden is on the respondent. See
supra text accompanying note 321. However, as just discussed, pursuant to the AB ruling in US-
Gambling, under Article XX the specific burden of proof with respect to the existence of less restrictive
measures is on the complainant as well.
351. See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
352. US-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 3,1 141.
353. Note that other major markets are also off-limits, such as the United States and now
Russia, so it is unlikely that production could be simply diverted to other places where seal products are
permitted. Canada has been attempting to open up other markets, such as China. Canada To Sell Seal
Meat to China, CBC NEWS (Jan, 12, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-
labrador/story/2011/01/12/nl-china-seal- lI 2.html.
354. For a complete description of Canada's intransigence and spotty enforcement record in
preventing cruelty to seals, see EFSA Report, supra note 10.
355. Delimatsis, supra note 321; Doyle, supra note 345.
356. China-Publications andAudiovisual, supra note 28,1 127.
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measure under scrutiny was not itself an expression of public morals. Rather,
the impugned measure was a modality claimed to be supportive of the
underlying moral regulation.357 This makes the measure different from the one
at issue in US-Gambling. Especially where a WTO member is justifying a
regulation in its noninstrumental aspect as an expression of intrinsic moral
beliefs or intuitions, scrutiny should be higher where a measure looks like some
kind of commercial restriction rather than the kind of sanction usually
associated with an expression of moral disapprobation, such as a ban that
directly targets conduct that is the object of moral opprobrium. Canada's
Prohibition-era ban on alcohol could be understood in part as a noninstrumental
expression of moral opposition to drinking (like bans in some Islamic
countries); but the operation of governmental liquor monopolies would require
a much more elaborate justificatory logic on noninstrumental grounds, for
instance. The EU seals ban is a clear example of a direct expression of intrinsic
moral disapprobation, and as the disapprobation reflects the widely held beliefs
of the community, the measure is certainly "necessary" in its noninstrumental
aspect.358
Any alternative approach to assessing the noninstrumental aspect of
moral regulation that mimics the approach to instrumental regulation may well
result in intractable dilemmas of legitimacy and institutional competence for
the WTO adjudicator.359 Various Islamic countries and Israel have restrictions
on importing swine and pork products. There may be arguments within the
relevant religious communities as to whether consumption of the products in
question is actually incompatible with religious strictures. Is the WTO
adjudicator then to summon different leaders within those religious
communities, and make a determination about whether the ban is necessary for
purposes of upholding the underlying religious creed or law? Or with respect to
India's restrictions on imports of beef, should the WTO adjudicator really
interrogate Hindu beliefs about the sanctity of cows, therefore raising the
question of whether the ban on beef is really necessary to avoid offending
Hindu sensibilities? Such decisionmaking would be inherently at odds with one
of the major purposes of allowing moral regulation under the WTO in the first
place: preserving the pluralism of the members of the international community
that constitute the WTO.360
Canada and Norway claim that their sealing practices are humane. The
EU ban expresses widely held beliefs that these practices are inhumane or
cruel. This expressive function of the law cannot fully be assessed through the
weighing or debating of scientific evidence of how much or little seals suffer
from a given method of killing. It may be widely believed in the European
357. As such, it could not be considered to be a measure that directly regulated public morals at
all.
358. See STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
27-28 (1985) (arguing that the ethical dimensions of regulation, including moral stigmatization, may not
be more appropriately served by economic forms of regulation).
359. For further discussion of the institutional problems with adjudicating moral and religious
claims, see infra Part V.
360. See infra Part V.
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Union that the very spectacle of the animals being slaughtered for commercial
exploitation in callous indifference to their suffering is dehumanizing and an
affront to the proper relation of man to animal-just as the Puritans found that
bear-baiting was inherently degrading or dehumanizing.361 It is erroneous for
Canada and Norway to maintain that science can establish that any particular
method of slaughter is not cruel or that any particular level of suffering is
necessarily acceptable as humane. This is contrary to the fundamental principle,
articulated in numerous cases, that a WTO member is entitled, as a sovereign
prerogative, to determine the level of protection it is seeking from its
regulation. Consistent with the pluralist approach of this Article, the role for the
WTO adjudicator is to assess the contribution of the measure to the level of
protection chosen by the regulating member.
The importance of sincerity, and of assuring that the measure is not a
pretext for protectionist, discriminatory treatment of imports, is sometimes
confused with the notion that invocation of the public morals exception
requires moral purity. In the US-Gambling case, for example, Antigua
unsuccessfully questioned the legitimacy of the United States' objective, given
that the United States did not ban all gambling but only Internet gambling. In
the context of animal welfare, critics of the European Union may point to
practices permitted with respect to treatment of animals other than seals that
seem prima facie to be as cruel and inhumane as the treatment of seals that is
the concern of the EU regulation. Yet, properly interpreted from a pluralist
point of view, this reality does not undermine the sincere or bona fide character
of the seals regulation as an animal welfare measure. A number of observations
to support this contention are in order. First, moral or spiritual beliefs about
animals and the acceptability or unacceptability of certain practices in the
treatment of them may well result in different animals being viewed as having
different kinds of relationships to human beings, just as the purpose of the
infliction of suffering, as well as its level or intensity, may well matter, as we
have already noted (the significance of "commodification" in many animal
welfarist moral theories). Accusing Hindus of hypocrisy, for example, because
they view cows as sacred but not chickens, is simply not taking pluralism
seriously.
Second, there is nothing in the text of Article XX(a) that requires, for the
invocation of the public morals exception, that the moral beliefs or values at
issue be of such a priority that they trump all other moral beliefs, values, or
social interests. This would render regulatory schemes that balance or
harmonize some beliefs or values with other beliefs or values indefensible in
light of their supposed objective to protect public morals. But sincerity does not
imply fanaticism. Recognizing pluralism, the recent WTO panel report in the
COOL case notes: "it is not inconceivable that parliaments and governments
pursue more than one objective through a certain measure. Different
constituencies and legislators may have different objectives, which nonetheless
361. See MACAULAY, supra note 25.
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lead to the adoption of a particular measure." 362 Indeed, it would be odd if
Article XX operated only to protect absolutist moral positions, thereby
opposing elements of value pluralism in WTO member societies.363 As we have
already noted in discussing the indigenous exception to the EU regulation in
connection with the MFN clause in Article I of the GATT, concern for the
existence and way of life of certain human communities may need to be
balanced against the moral concern of animal welfare-but this does not make
the latter any less of a genuine reflection of the prevailing beliefs or values of
the society in question.
Third, as we have already noted, the beliefs and values that are relevant
for purposes of Article XX(a) are those prevailing today.364 The process of
changing laws, regulations and practices to reflect today's values (which, as we
have discussed, is ongoing in many contexts in the European Union regarding
treatment of animals) is not an instantaneous one. Only a despotic regime could
change at once or in a short period of time hundreds if not thousands of laws
and regulations to conform in such a diverse federal community as the
European Union. Thus, it is totally unreasonable, indeed absurd, to expect the
European Union to have already reflected the prevailing values and beliefs
behind the EU regulation on seals with respect to every other context of
treatment of animals. Here the observations of the recent Tuna/Dolphin III
panel are apposite:
As established above, the US dolphin-safe provisions aim at protecting
dolphins. That a particular piece of legislation does not afford protection to
other animals or marine species should not be sufficient reason to consider the
goal of the measure to be illegitimate. As the Appellate Body has recognized,
'certain complex public health or environmental problems may be tackled only
when [sic] a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting
measures.'3 65
b. Article AY(b): Health
The EU measure is also justifiable insofar as it is necessary for the
protection of animal "health" within the meaning of GATT Article XX(b). The
meaning of animal health includes mental or psychological health, which is
obviously impaired by intense suffering and trauma in the manner of killing.
Interpreting language in Article 2.2 of the TBT that is essentially identical to
that in GATT Article XX(b), the Tuna/Dolphin III panel held:
The protection of dolphins may be understood as intended to protect animal life
or health or the environment. In this respect, a measure that aims at the
protection of animal life or health need not, in our view, be directed exclusively
362. COOL, supra note 243, 7.691.
363. As noted above, supra note 331, in the US-Clove Cigarettes case the Appellate Body has
reaffirmed the pluralist approach that a Member may, in principle, balance different and to some extent
even conflicting objectives in a legitimate regulatory scheme, provided that the regulatory distinctions it
draws can indeed be justified by such balancing.
364. However, the history of a belief can be probative of its bona fide or sincere character. See
supra Sections I.A and B.
365. Panel Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale
ofTuna and Tuna Products, T 7.442, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna/Dolphin lH1].
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to endangered or depleted species or populations, to be legitimate. Article 2.2
refers to "animal life or health" in general terms, and does not require that such
protection be tied to a broader conservation objective. We therefore read these
terms as allowing Members to pursue policies that aim at also protecting
individual animals or species whose sustainability as a group is not
threatened.366
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the use of trade
measures to protect dolphins was a "legitimate objective" within the meaning
of TBT 2.2.367
Just as Article XX(a) may be used to condition imports on policies of other
countries that relate to the protection of public morals, so may Article XX(b).
Nor is the ambit of "animal health" under Article XX(b) confined to animals on
the territory of the regulating WTO member. The disciplines of the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) 369 explicitly confine the concept of animal
health in this way, indicating that the drafters realized that, since the concept in
the GATT was not so limited, they would require specific language to cabin the
ambit of SPS to only those measures affecting animal health within the
regulating jurisdiction. In any case, the principle of effectiveness in treaty
interpretation 370 compels a reading of animal health within Article XX(b) that
is not restricted to the health of animals in the territory of the regulating
member. Many species of animals are migratory and may appear in more than
one WTO member's territory over their lifetime or even over a rather short
span of time. Some often dwell in the high seas.371 Effective protection of the
health of such migratory animals would be undermined by imposing a
territorial restriction not required by the text of Article XX(b), given the
uncertainty that would be created concerning which WTO members, if any,
could protect those animals consistent with Article XX(b).
The Appellate Body has held that human life and health are among the
most pressing or fundamental interests protected under Article XX, thus
requiring a high degree of deference to domestic regulation. This suggests that
the Appellate Body would afford a lesser margin of deference to the European
Union's measure in Seal Products than it did to the French asbestos ban in
EC-Asbestos. However, as is clear from cases like US-Gambling and
Brazil-Tyres, the AB's general jurisprudence of Article XX has increasingly
366. Id. 7.347. This reading is strongly confirmed by the fact that the World Organisation for
Animal Health has, since the beginning of this millennium, viewed animal welfare as an essential and
growing part of its mandate, and has emphasized the close connection of animal welfare to animal
health. WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, THE OIE's ACHIEVEMENTS IN ANIMAL WELFARE (Dec. 14,
2011), http://www.oie.int/animal-welfare/animal-welfare-key-themes/.
367. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 342 (May 16, 2012), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/38 I abr e.doc [hereinafter AB Report, US-
Tuna/Dolphin III].
368. US-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 3, 121.
369. The SPS regulates measures that WTO members can take to protect health, and is one of
the agreements to come out of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
370. For a description of this principle, see generally H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation
and the Principle ofEffectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1949).
371. See, e.g., US-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 3.
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recognized the difficulty of scientifically proving or establishing that a measure
is the least restrictive alternative to achieve a given objective, or of determining
whether in fact a hypothetical less restrictive alternative is likely to be
affordable and effective in the circumstances. As we have discussed earlier in
this Article, 37 2 the EU ban is supported by ample evidence of the negative
health effects of the killing methods in question, and considerations of less
restrictive alternatives have resulted in considerable doubt as to whether these
could ever be effective, especially given that Canada and Norway do not accept
the level of protection sought by the European Union.
A 2008 scientific report to the Animal Welfare Working Group of the
World Organisation for Animal Health found that "[a]nother problem is that
implementation of the legal conditions laid down [by Canada and Norway]
depends on the climatic conditions under which the sealers operate.
Enforcement is also difficult and in many circumstances impossible." 373
Indeed, the scientific report questioned whether the type of standards that the
Organisation had developed could be applied practicably at all to ensure the
humane killing of seals "on the ice in extreme weather conditions." This
further shows that accepting seal products based on humane hunting standards
is not a reasonable available alternative to a ban, given the conditions in which
the hunt takes place, and the constraints of existing monitoring and
enforcement methods.
Even if, in theory, these obstacles could be overcome, without the support
of the governments and industries in Canada and Norway, it is impossible to
imagine an effectively monitored and implemented labeling or code of conduct
scheme that could achieve the European Union's chosen level of protection.
Only through agreement with Canada and Norway could the EU participate
directly in the monitoring and enforcement of the standards in question;
otherwise, it would be impossible for the EU to insure that, in fact, any labeled
or certified product arriving at its borders was in fact made from an animal
killed humanely. As the Appellate Body held in US-Gambling, interpreting
the public morals exception in GATS, a reasonably available alternative is one
that a Member can implement without requiring the consent or cooperation of
other WTO Members.374
C. The EU Seal Products Ban Does Not Violate the TBT
As discussed above, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which
372. See supra Section II.B.
373. DAVID WILKINS, COMMERCIAL KILLING OF WILDLIFE, SECOND REPORT TO THE ANIMAL
WELFARE WORKING GROUP 3, World Organisation for Animal Health (OLE) (2008), available at
http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D6547.pdf.
374. US-Gambling, 317 ("In our view, the Panel's "necessity" analysis was flawed because
it did not focus on an alternative measure that was reasonably available to the United States to achieve
the stated objectives regarding the protection of public morals or the maintenance of public order.
Engaging in consultations with Antigua, with a view to arriving at a negotiated settlement that achieves
the same objectives as the challenged United States' measures, was not an appropriate alternative for the
Panel to consider because consultations are by definition a process, the results of which are uncertain
and therefore not capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case.").
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resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization to replace the previous
treaty regime of the GATT, also resulted in the creation of several new
agreements to regulate trade. One of the most important was the TBT, which is
notable because it goes beyond the traditional GATT principle of eliminating
discrimination in trade policy, to promoting regulatory efficiency "beyond the
border."375 The TBT does this by requiring particular procedures when
countries assess risk and establish regulations. For example, if there is an
international standard on point, the domestic standard must be "based on" the
international standard.7  Countries must eliminate "unnecessary obstacles" to
trade.377 Countries must also, in certain circumstances, accept the standard
setting procedures of other countries.378 In short, regulations must be rationally
related to established risks.
While the TBT Agreement contains a set of additional obligations to
those of the GATT, the Appellate Body has nevertheless held that the TBT
Agreement should be interpreted so as to preserve the same kind of balance
between trade liberalization goals and regulatory autonomy that is reflected in
the "right to regulate" in GATT.3 79
Canada and Norway argue that the European measure violates virtually
every article of the TBT Agreement.3o These claims run from procedural to
substantive violations of the TBT.
These claims confront a central difficulty at the outset. Arguably, TBT
does not apply to this type of measure to the extent that it is an expression of
moral opprobrium. Therefore, even if the measure were found not to be
justified as instrumentally necessary for one of the legitimate objectives
covered by the TBT, it may still be justified for its noninstrumental, morally
expressive function as necessary for the protection of public morals under
GATT Article XX.
To what sort of measure does the TBT apply?38 ' The criteria for the
application of the TBT are set out in Annex 1 to the TBT, and clarified in the
EC-Asbestos case. For the TBT to apply, according to Annex 1, there must be
a document that lays down, sets out, or stipulates product characteristics,
including administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.382
As clarified in EC-Asbestos, the regulation in question must: (1) apply to an
375. For a discussion of the concept of a "beyond the border" measure, see P.J. Lloyd, The
Architecture of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 327,331 (2001).
376. Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, arts. 2.4-.5, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 121
[hereinafter TBT]; see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC-Sardines] (discussing the meaning of the
term "based on").
377. TBT, supra note 376, art. 2.2.
378. Id. art. 2.7.
379. US-Clove Cigarettes, 95-96.
380. Canada's Panel Request, supra note 20 (claiming that the seal products ban violates
Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, and 7.1; Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20, claiming that the
seal products ban violates Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 8.1, 8.2, 9.2 and
9.3).
381. For another perspective on whether the TBT applies in the Seal Products case, see Nielsen,
supra note 1.
382. TBT, supra note 376, Annex 1.
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identifiable product or group of products, (2) lay down one or more
characteristics of the product, and (3) make compliance with the product
characteristic mandatory.383
There is a strong case that the TBT should not apply in the Seal Products
case to the extent that the structure and provisions of the TBT do not
contemplate the assessment of measures of a noninstrumental character that are
384intended to express intrinsic moral beliefs. This is evident in the use of the
very word "technical" to qualify the kinds of measures that fit within the ambit
of TBT as well as the exclusion of "public morals" from the (admittedly non-
exhaustive) list of "legitimate objectives" in TBT. While "technical regulation"
is a defined term in the TBT, s it has not been suggested that "Technical
Regulation" is a special term within the meaning of Vienna Convention Article
31(4). Thus, in light of the requirement to interpret the "ordinary meaning" of
the words of a treaty, the WTO adjudicator must not only consider the defining
language with respect to "Technical Regulation" but must not ignore the
ordinary meaning of the word "technical" which, tracing its Greek roots in the
notion of techni, implies something instrumental, not a moral expression or
valuation. It may be true that some secondary regulation and administrative
action to enforce or apply the EU ban could be characterized as technical, or
instrumental, to the direct expression of moral opprobrium that constitutes the
ban itself. But the provisions of the TBT are inherently unsuited to the
determination of whether the EU ban, taken in its aspect as noninstrumental
moral regulation, is inconsistent with the purposes of the WTO system. One
need only examine the nature of the least restrictive means test embodied in
Article 2.2 of the TBT, which refers to measures that are least trade-restrictive,
taking into account the risks of non-fulfillment of the member's objective.
This suggests a test that is oriented to an instrumental balancing of some
kind. 87
The result of such an interpretation is that any measure of a
noninstrumental character would risk violating Article 2.2 if it has any trade-
restrictive effect. India's restrictions on beef and certain Islamic countries' and
Israel's on pork would be illegal under the TBT. And many other such
measures are simply not tractable to an analysis based on risk assessment.
Noninstrumental moral regulation would violate TBT even if it could be
383. EC-Asbestos (Appellate), supra note 299.
384. More than one commentator has suggested that TBT may not apply. See, e.g., Lester,
supra note 100.
385. EC-Asbestos (Panel), supra note 291; EC-Sardines, supra note 376.
386. TBT, supra note 376, art. 2.2. The full text of Article 2.2 is as follows:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with
a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For
this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such
legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or
the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter
alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or
intended end-uses of products.
387. Id.
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justified under GATT Article XX(a), "public morals." Such an outcome would
be contrary to the axiom of the Appellate Body that "[t]he balance set out in the
preamble of the TBT Agreement between, on the one hand, the desire to avoid
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and, on the other hand, the
recognition of Members' right to regulate, is not, in principle, different from
the balance set out in the GATT 1994, where obligations such as national
treatment in Article III are qualified by the general exceptions provision of
Article XX."'
Canada's reductio ad absurdum is that the EU seals ban is not oriented, in
its instrumental aspect, towards a legitimate objective under the TBT.
However, as already noted, in Tuna/Dolphin III, the panel held that animal
welfare (as distinct from conservation or sustainability objectives) was a
legitimate objective under the TBT, a finding that was upheld by the Appellate
Body389; thus, with respect to the instrumental aspect of the EU regulation, the
TBT is arguably applicable. Moreover, in the recent COOL case, the panel
found that the fact that other WTO members have policies aimed at an
objective is an indication of its legitimacy under TBT Article 2.2; as we have
set out in detail in an earlier section of this Article, many countries have
legislated to protect animal welfare, and a number of different WTO members
have taken measures to protect seals.390 This enhances confidence that the
measure is based on genuine or sincere ethical concerns, rather than the
demand for protection of some local producer interests.
The application of the MFN and National Treatment obligations in
Article 2.1 of TBT to the EU seals regulation should be similar to that of
Articles I and 111:4 of the GATT, discussed above. In the US-Clove Cigarettes
ruling, the Appellate Body noted: "The national treatment obligations of Article
2.1 and Article 111:4 are built around the same core terms, namely, 'like
products' and 'treatment no less favourable."' 39' The AB has emphasized: "the
object and purpose of the TBTAgreement is to strike a balance between, on the
one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, Members'
right to regulate. This object and purpose therefore suggests that Article 2.1
should not be interpreted as prohibiting any detrimental impact on competitive
opportunities for imports in cases where such detrimental impact on imports
stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions." 392
As we have set forth in detail above, the regulatory distinctions in the EU
seals ban, including the exceptions, are all connected to legitimate purposes,
including animal welfare in both its instrumental and noninstrumental aspects,
respect for the territoriality principle as understood in EU law, protection of
aboriginal rights, and sustainable resource management.
While, as stated in our GATT National Treatment analysis, we do not
believe that Canada or Norway can establish that the EU ban is detrimental to
388. US-Clove Cigarettes, S 96.
389. AB Report, Tuna/Dolphin III, supra note 367, 342.
390. See supra Section I.A.




the competitive opportunities of the "group" of "like" imported products in
relation to the group of "like" EU products, in any case, any such effects would
simply derive from the operation of the legitimate regulatory distinctions in the
scheme, and thus, under the approach of the Appellate Body in US-Clove
Cigarettes, there would be no violation of 2.1. In Tuna/Dolphin III, the
Appellate Body found a violation of TBT 2.1, based on the analytical
framework it set out in US-Clove Cigarettes: the United States imposed,
facially and explicitly, a greater regulatory burden on imports of tuna from
Mexico seeking the "dolphin-safe" regulation than on other tuna that was
harvested outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific, where Mexico's tuna fishing
industry is located, and the AB accepted the factual finding of the panel that the
US had not shown that the much greater risk to dolphins from the tuna fishery
within the ETP justified the different burden.39 3 Regardless of whether the
panel's fact finding was objective and accurate in Tuna/Dolphin III, the EU
seals regulation does not impose any additional regulatory burden with respect
to Canadian or Norwegian seal products as opposed to products from sealing
within the EU or in third countries. The requirements of the ban are identical
regardless of the particular geographic location of the sealing. As already
noted, the indigenous exception in the ban applies regardless of where the
aboriginal communities are located.
Once we accept that under TBT Article 2.2, protection of animal welfare
is a legitimate objective, the EU's measure is justifiable for much the same
reason that it is justified under Article XX paragraphs (a) and (b), as discussed
above. 394 Indeed, under the TBT the burden of proof is in the first instance on
the complainant to show that the measure is not justified, since there is no
prima facie violation of general provisions of the GATT presumed when a
measure is examined under the TBT. 39 5 Further, just as is the case with Article
XX, under TBT Article 2.2, a WTO member's right to determine its level of
protection-however strict-is inviolate,396 a necessary implication, one might
393. AB Report, US-Tuna/Dolphin III, supra note 367.
394. See supra Subsection IV.B.3.
395. Thus, in US-Tuna./Dolphin III, the Appellate Body explained:
"With respect to the burden of proof in showing that a technical regulation is inconsistent with
Article 2.2, the complainant must prove its claim that the challenged measure creates an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. In order to make a primafacie case, the complainant
must present evidence and arguments sufficient to establish that the challenged measure is more
trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the contribution it makes to the legitimate objectives,
taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. In making its prima facie case, a
complainant may also seek to identify a possible alternative measure that is less trade regrictive,
makes an equivalent contribution to the relevant objective, and is reasonably available. It is then
for the respondent to rebut the complainant's prima facie case, by presenting evidence and
arguments showing that the challenged measure is not more trade restrictive than necessary to
achieve the contribution it makes toward the objective pursued and by demonstrating, for
example, that the alternative measure identified by the complainant is not, in fact, "reasonably
available", is not less trade restrictive, or does not make an equivalent contribution to the
achievement of the relevant legitimate objective."
AB Report, US-Tuna/Dolphin III, supra note 367,1 323 (internal citation omitted).
396. COOL, supra note 243, 117.611-7.613. In US-Tuna III, the Appellate Body emphasized
the language in the preamble of the TBT Agreement to the effect that a Member has a right to achieve its
legitimate objective "at levels it considers appropriate." AB Report, US-Tuna/Dolphin III, supra note
367,1316.
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say, of the very principle of "the right to regulate."
But how then to do justice to the measure as a whole, given that it
contains noninstrumental morally expressive features that are not suited to
scrutiny under an agreement designed to address technical or instrumental
regulations? 397 One approach to this difficulty is suggested in the analysis of
the panel in EC-Biotech of a measure that the European Community argued
had a dual purpose (partly food and agricultural safety, and partly general
consumer protection). The EC-Biotech panel took a bifurcated approach to
justification. The panel held that even if the measure failed the requirements of
the SPS Agreement to the extent that is purpose was covered by SPS, it still
could be justifiable in principle due to its non-SPS purposes, which would be
assessed under different legal provisions. 39 8 Thus, on this reasoning, even if
instrumental aspects of the EU seals regulation were to fall afoul of the TBT, to
the extent that it served the purpose of an expression of intrinsic moral beliefs
and intuitions, it would still be capable of justification within the framework of
Article XX(a) of the GATT.
D. The EU Seal Products Ban Does Not Violate the Agreement on
Agriculture
The Norwegian request for a panel also argues in passing that the EU
measure violates Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 399 The
Agreement on Agriculture resulted from the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations. The purpose of the agreement was to bring agriculture within the
fold of the GATT system, from which it had traditionally been excluded.4 00 It
subjected the agricultural industry to many of the provisions of the GATT.
Norway has argued that the European Union has violated Article 4.2,
which states that "[m]embers shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any
measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary
customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5."401
In essence, Article 4.2 prohibits the use of agriculture-specific non-tariff
barriers. Non-tariff barriers include quantitative restrictions, voluntary export
restraints, and other measures designed to restrict flows of trade through means
other than imposing tariffs at the border. Norway's argument is likely to be that
since the European Union is imposing a regulation that limits the importation of
seal products, this is a non-tariff barrier on an agricultural product that is
prohibited by Article 4.2.
There are two reasons why this argument will not succeed. First, it is
397. For a history of the development and purpose of the TBT, see HoEKMAN & KOSTECKI,
supra note 205, at 112-16.
398. Id. 7.162-7/171.
399. Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20, at 2; Agreement on Agriculture, Annex IA, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410
[hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]. Notably, Canada has not made this claim. Compare Canada's
Panel Request, supra note 20, with Norway's Panel Request, supra note 20.
400. This has been termed "agricultural exceptionalism." Randy Green, The Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 819, 820 (2000).
401. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 399, art. 4.2.
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possible that hunting seals in the wild will not be considered agricultural in
nature. Annex 1 of the Agreement defines which products are covered by the
402
Agreement. While raw furskins, hides, and skins are included, it is unclear
whether this refers to products produced through farming techniques or
captured in the wild. The nature and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture
was to cover traditional farming practices, which are often subject to
protectionism.403 Sealing is not a traditional farming practice, and therefore
may not be covered by the agreement.
Second, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture "does not prevent
the use of non-tariff import restrictions consistent with the provisions of the
GATT or other WTO agreements which are applicable to traded goods
generally (industrial or agricultural)."404 Therefore, if the analysis above
regarding the General Exceptions clause and other GATT provisions is correct,
Article 4.2 does not present a problem for the ban. For these reasons, Norway's
claim under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is unlikely to succeed.
V. PERMITTING PLURALISM: WHY PLURALISM MATTERS FOR THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO AND THE CHALLENGE OF ACCOMMODATING
NONINSTRUMENTAL MORALITY
Thus far, this Article has argued that the European Union's measure
restricting trade in seal products was enacted because of a genuine concern for
animal welfare, and that this moral motivation for restricting trade should be a
sufficient justification, under WTO law, for the European Union to enact a
trade-restrictive measure. 405 These legal interpretations are based on the prior
jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body as well as structural and textual
considerations in the relevant WTO treaties. But we have also brought to bear
in our analysis a perspective that we call "pluralism." In this section of the
Article, we seek to articulate more explicitly and conceptually what pluralism
entails and why it is particularly important to preserving the proper institutional
role and the legitimacy of the WTO.
As discussed above,406 the WTO grew out of the GATT, an informal
treaty regime that was meant to provide simple rules to facilitate trade among
nations. It was not meant to be an invasive or revolutionary regime; indeed, the
GATT was the result of the failure to develop a comprehensive international
organization to cover international trade (the failed International Trade
Organization).407 The GATT placed certain basic limits on the ways in which
states could regulate trade, to prevent another depression by ensuring openness
and guarding against spiraling protectionist, discriminatory, beggar-thy-
402. Id. Annex 1.
403. See Green, supra note 400, at 830-831.
404. Agriculture: Explanation, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
agric e/ag-intro02_accessse.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
405. See supra Parts II and III.
406. See supra Section IV.A.
407. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 205.
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neighbor responses to domestic economic and social pressures.408
The move from GATT to WTO certainly expanded the number of topics
that the international trade law regime governed but the WTO can no more
claim to be a legitimate comprehensive governance regime than could the
GATT. It is not like a domestic government, which can weigh all relevant,
competing factors and reconsider de novo the policy choices of its members,
nor is it a general world administrative agency. The WTO has a narrow remit:
regulating international trade to ensure that there are not unnecessary or
discriminatory barriers to trading. But second-guessing bona fide moral
regulation is not part of its mandate.
While the WTO has had to assess whether rationales for legislation are
legitimate, in the sense that they are not merely pretextual reasons or false
barriers to trade, it is not designed to pass judgment on the substance of those
legislative rationales. As we have noted, in the US-Clove Cigarettes decision,
the AB has held that both the GATT and the TBT Agreement reflect a balanced
"right to regulate"; WTO Members may pursue legitimate goals provided they
do so in an even-handed, nondiscriminatory manner, avoiding where possible
harmful effects on trade. If noninstrumental motivations are excluded from the
grounds that justify trade policy, the WTO will, in effect, conclude that only
material concerns such as health and security are legitimate policy goals. All
moral considerations will have to be argued in instrumentalist terms.
Such a development would be on a collision course with the changing
character of the WTO's membership. As John Ruggie famously argued, the
post-war international economic institutions were premised on "embedded
liberalism," a loose consensus among more or less like-thinking Western
developed nations on the appropriate degree and kind of regulatory diversity
consistent with effective global economic governance. 409 While at the time,
regulatory diversity was likely understood in terms of instrumentalist views of
matters such as health, environment, and so forth, the drafters did still feel the
need to include the concept of "public morals." When we turn to today's WTO
and realize that some of the most economically significant members, including
China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India, have policy and regulatory cultures
deeply shaped by traditions very different from what might be called "Western"
secular instrumental reason, it becomes evident that narrowing the kind of
rationale permitted as a basis for justified regulation under WTO law, while the
WTO's diversity broadens and deepens, would be setting the scene for a
significant legitimacy crisis.
From the outset, under "embedded liberalism," a key challenge for the
multilateral trading system was to reconcile a commitment to regulatory
diversity with an effective set of treaty norms and interpretative canons to
provide confidence that diverse regulatory goals are not used as pretexts for
protectionist measures-undermining the basic trade liberalization bargain and
the effectiveness and credibility of the institution.
408. For a discussion of the basic obligations of the GATT, see supra Section IV.B.
409. See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 96 (2002).
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Yet many of the devices that have been used to achieve this balance need
to be applied with particular sensitivity, where regulatory differences are not
simply rooted in the divergent policy choices of regulatory authorities (a kind
of regulatory diversity long accepted as part of the "embedded liberalism"
vision), but in differences in underlying values and beliefs in different societies.
It is often easy for WTO officials or adjudicators to begin by assuming
that a rationale for government action is sincere or not pretextual when the
claimed value is universally shared or itself stated with specificity in the WTO
treaties. Protection of human health is an example. The test for pretextualism in
such instances focuses on the relationship between means and ends: the
assurance that health is not merely a pretext comes from scientific and other
evidence that the measure in question is instrumentally rational from the
perspective of protecting human health. By contrast, where the basis for
arguing that a measure is not pretextual is at least partly motivated by
noninstrumental moral concerns not universally shared by WTO members,
there is a risk that a WTO official or adjudicator who does not share the value
in question, or is unfamiliar from its own moral experience with this kind of
belief, will begin from a presumption that there is a strong risk of
pretextualism. As Joseph Weiler has articulated410 and as Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye have also argued,4 1 1 the WTO insider community is drawn from a
world of diplomats and bureaucrats where a certain kind of instrumental-often
economic-rationality dominates conceptions of appropriate public policy. As
our analysis of the Seal Products dispute has illustrated, using tests or devices
that employ instrumental rationality, such as means/ends reasoning, simply
does not work to establish the non-pretextual character of noninstrumental
moral regulation. Under an instrumental approach, that a member has chosen a
ban, the most trade restrictive kind of measure, over other means such as
consumer labeling, may well be a strong indication that the measure is strongly
oriented to protectionism of a kind that would undermine the basic trade
liberalization bargain; this is the logic, as we noted, of Article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement. But in the case of noninstrumental moral regulation, the use of
outright prohibition may be essential to express the moral sentiment underlying
the measure.412
Accustomed to judging instrumental regulation, WTO officials and
adjudicators may also be inclined to consider elements of apparent
inconsistency or exceptions in a regulation as prima facie indicators that it may
not be genuinely or sincerely an expression of the values in question. They may
simply not appreciate just how finely differentiated noninstrumental moral
beliefs are, or that the same citizens may genuinely hold with equal sincerity
two different noninstrumental moral beliefs (for instance, animal welfare, as
410. J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191 (2001).
411. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY 264 (Roger B. Porter et. al. eds., 2001).
412. Robert Howse, Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the
Future of the Regulatory State, 31 ALBERTA L. REv. 455, 461 (1993).
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well as the intrinsic value of traditional indigenous ways of life) that require a
complex reconciliation. That a measure reflects such a reconciliation does not
thereby impugn, even presumptively, the sincerity of either of the
noninstrumental moral beliefs in question. Thus the perspective of pluralism
entails a sensitivity to the varied totality of deeply held beliefs within each
society, and even within the value system of a given individual.
Where noninstrumental moral concerns are at issue, to avoid a
presumption of pretextualism, WTO officials and adjudicators need to become
familiar with and have the imagination to see the workings of a system of
values that may be alien to their own moral sensibilities, especially at first
glance. This is in part an exercise of imagining otherness. It entails, as early
sections of this Article illustrate-examining, in depth and with sympathy or at
least a presumption of respect, the origins of the seal regulation in moral
concerns about animal welfare-a judgment about sincerity or genuineness of
the measure that does not inappropriately import conceptions applicable to
different kinds of moral values or policy aims.
Thus, by permitting pluralism, the WTO fulfills its own institutional
mandate more effectively and does not unnecessarily encroach on the
regulatory autonomy of member states. This does not mean that the WTO is, or
should be, value-neutral. There may be some kinds of moral commitments that
are inconsistent with the values that underpin the WTO itself; it would, for
instance, be impossible to reconcile measures that are based on a visceral
dislike of or prejudice concerning a particular people or nation with the concept
of nondiscrimination in the WTO system. How the WTO should manage the
possible tension between the commitment to pluralism and the demands of
international law and morality beyond the WTO regime itself is a complex
question, deeply connected to the debate over the "fragmentation" of the
international legal order.4 13 So far, the Appellate Body has considered the remit
of WTO dispute settlement not to include the enforcement of norms from
elsewhere in the international legal order,414 but has taken into account such
norms in the way in which the law of the WTO itself is applied.4 15 Whether this
approach strikes the right balance will be an important question for future
scholarship, especially if, as we hope, the case in this Article that the WTO
should in general be open to and respectful of pluralism is persuasive.
413. Chairman of the Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the
Study Group of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (by Martti
Koskenniemi), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4_1682.pdf. Scholars
concerned about the fragmentation of the international order are concerned about the proliferation of
new sources of international legal rules, such that the hierarchy or interrelation of legal rules is difficult
to ascertain, especially given the parallel trends of the proliferation of international and regional courts
and tribunals.
414. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/ABIR (Mar. 6, 2006).
415. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTIDS26/AB/R (Jan. 16., 1998) (describing the precautionary
principle); Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties




In a recent dispute with China, trade measures that were linked to its
censorship laws were considered to be justified in principle under the public
morals exception, even though aspects of these laws may collide with
international human rights norms. Notably, the United States did not raise
issues of human rights in its arguments against China's invocation of public
morality.416 Even if WTO law cannot plausibly be used to enforce human rights
(at least without a prior ruling of a human rights body on which the WTO
dispute settlement organs could rely), it is certainly the case that human rights
norms, especially those that have the status of customary international law or to
which the member invoking public morals is bound by treaty, could be relevant
in interpreting the proper meaning of public morals.
But here also pluralism remains relevant, for international human rights
law itself contains various limiting or balancing features that provide a margin
of appreciation to different states to implement human rights in a manner
sensitive to cultural and religious difference, for example. What is certainly
consistent with pluralism in the WTO is the ability of individual WTO
members to use their own trade sanctions against states that violate human
rights; precisely in this instance, the content of public morals would be
interpreted to include international human rights concerns, such that sanctions
are justified under Article XX(a). For example, the United States and the
European Union have maintained trade sanctions against Burma in response to
human rights violations there; these sanctions have not been challenged as in
violation of WTO law.4 1 7 The two-sided approach, where the WTO does not
itself enforce non-WTO international norms such as human rights, but allows
its individual members to take enforcement action through trade sanctions, is
defensible in practice. As we suggest, however, the question of the conceptual
limits to pluralism imposed by the essential morality of the international system
is one that requires further analysis, beginning from the premise that, in
general, pluralism is desirable in the WTO.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered whether morality is an adequate justification
for restricting trade measures under WTO law. We have examined this question
in relation to the current Seal Products dispute at the WTO. Analyzing the legal
issues at stake in the Seal Products dispute, we have argued that the EU's
restriction on the import and export of seal products for moral reasons does not
violate WTO law. Even if it does violate a positive obligation under WTO law,
the restriction can be justified for public policy reasons under the General
Exceptions clause, Article XX. Moral, ethical, and philosophical reasons
should be considered adequate to justify trade-restrictive measures. If the WTO
does not recognize these types of justifications, it risks imposing a secular,
materialist vision of politics on all its member states. Instead, the WTO should
respect pluralism, allowing countries to justify their trade-related actions
416. Id. at 51-85.
417. See Robert L. Howse & Jared M. Genser, Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible
with WTO Law?, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 165, 174-79 (2008).
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through noninstrumental reasoning that may seem compelling to certain
countries or peoples, even if frivolous or perhaps superstitious to others. The
fact that one group of veterinarians in one country has come to the conclusion
that the killing of seals by a particular method is humane or not cruel need not
preclude another country or people from interpreting differently, according to
their own moral commitments and attitudes, what is humane on the one hand
and cruel on the other. This position best accords with the institutional
competence and role of the WTO. Our analysis suggests a vision of the WTO's
institutional role, and its relationship to the regulatory autonomy of its member
states, which is deeply compatible with the embedded liberalism that
characterized the perspective of the founders of the original GATT;41 it is a
vision at odds with the expansive constitutionalist vision of the WTO as a
global economic regulator, assessing the rationality of all governmental policies
from a right to trade perspective. The latter vision has led to the legitimacy
crises the WTO has suffered from Seattle onward.4 19 Fortunately, these crises
have not led to the loss of legitimacy for the WTO dispute settlement organs in
their application of the basic rules of the system to discipline discrimination
and protectionism. And this is precisely due to a number of the jurisprudential
moves by the AB that we have discussed in this Article. There is no "right to
trade" in the WTO system, only a set of specific obligations to avoid certain
kinds of defined trade-restricting measures-in the case of domestic policies,
largely ones that are either discriminatory or gratuitously trade-restrictive. But,
as the AB has held, there is a foundational "right to regulate." This notion of
"the right to regulate" is perhaps where the AB comes closest to expressing the
pluralist perspective offered in this Article. According to the AB, the WTO
legal system does not itself grant to WTO members the right to regulate subject
420
to certain justifications, unlike-one should add-a domestic constitution.
Instead, it only confines or restricts the inherent right to regulate by certain very
limited, textually defined disciplines, some of which, like Article XX, are
aimed at clearly preserving important elements of the right to regulate even
within the specific disciplines provided in the WTO Agreements. There is no
requirement that, just because they affect trade, all of a member's policies be
rational or conform to any other general condition of a right to regulate that
might exist in a domestic constitution, for example. Legitimate, well-founded,
moral justifications such as respect for animal welfare and repugnance at
complicity with cruelty to animals should not be dismissed as grounds for
regulation, nor treated in a narrow and skeptical fashion.
418. JOHN G. RUGGIE, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 62 (1998);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 733 (1999); Howse, supra note
409.
419. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW, POLITICS, AND LEGITIMACY (2007);
Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 1 (2002).
420. China-Publications and Audiovisual, supra note 28.
432
